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The study is a reaction to the August 1998 financial crisis. The study has been prepared by a team
led by Michal Rutkowski and comprising Jeanine Braithwaite, Alexandre Marc, Mansoora Rashid,
Hjalte Sederlof, and Milan Vodopivec. Anastassia Alexandrova, Andrei Markov and Elena Zotova
from the Moscow Resident Mission, and Karen Mcconnell Brooks and Teresa Ho contributed to
parts of the report and offered invaluable insights and advice. The study benefited from the August
social crisis note written by a team led by Maureen Lewis.
The team visited Russia from November 11-20, and worked closely with Russian counterparts in
Moscow and in the raion of Ruza (Moscow oblast).  The team is grateful to the government, both at
the federal and oblast level, as well as to the Ruza officials, for their assistance, hospitality and
guidance. The tearn visited Russia again from December 8-12, 1998 for review of the first draft with
government officials and other stakeholders. The intra-Bank review of the first draft of this study
was held on December 10, 1998. Subsequently, a senior policy seminar for the Russian government
was held in Bor (Moscow oblast) on January 16-17, 1999,  with the participation of Deputy Prime
Minister  Ms.  Valentina  Matvenko and  the  Minister of  Labor  and  Social  Policy,  Mr.  Sergei
Kalashnikov. The revised study was presented to the Executive Board of the World Bank on March
24, 1999.
The study benefited very much from comments of the participants of the seminar, both those
from the govemment as well as those who came from various regions of Russia, including regional
and local governments and NGOs. Inside the Bank, the report was helped by suggestions of Marcelo
Selowsky and by comments provided by Robert J. Anderson, Anush Bezhanyan, Mary Canning,
Michael Carter, David Craig, Katy Dahlmaier, Michael Fuchs, Robert Holzmann, Jeni Klugman,
Arvo Kuddo, Chris Lovelace, Maureen Lewis, Ricardo Martin, Pradeep Mitra, Gillian Perkins,
Aleksandra Posarac, Jeff Procak, Brian Pinto, Mark Sundberg and Michael Walton. Gillian Perkins
helped with editing and Annie Milanzi, Nicole La Borde and Sidonie Jocktane put in shape the text
and the tables.EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1.  This report focuses on changes in the social protection system to lessen the social impact of the
economic  crisis that confronts the Russian Federation  today. The report is not comprehensive  and covers
exclusively the crisis-related issues. It addresses the key challenges of (i) coping with income decline
and increasing poverty, (ii) offsetting the consequences of reduced public expenditure in the social
sectors, (iii) targeting and delivering social assistance and benefits, and (iv) improving the functioning of
labor markets. It also deals with selected aspects of emergency assistance. Finally, it identifies possible
areas for Bank support.
2.  The report identifies the major pre-crisis vulnerabilities in the labor and social protection area: the
malfunctioning labor market resulting from the lack of enterprise restructuring; increasing poverty and
inequality;  and the failure of the state social protection system to deliver targeted benefits in an efficient
way. These pre-existing vulnerabilities were aggravated by the shock that began as a financial crisis, but
that is now evolving into a significant decline in real wages, incomes and standards of living. The report
finds that the August 1998 shock did not create any new or unprecedented problems for Russia's social
protection system. All of the problems existed in Russia before the crisis in the form of a persistent
malaise. The crisis deepened the problems and made it clearer than ever that Russia just cannot afford
any  longer to  postpone dealing with  them. Therefore, even  though  it  is essential  to confront the
immediate social fallout of the crisis, it is also of crucial importance to shape responses in the context of
medium-term  changes and development  challenges.
4.  The decline in real incomes is expected to lead to (i) a cumulative drop in average income in the
period 1998-99  of about 13%, and (ii) an even more serious decline in social expenditures related both to
the GDP per capita drop and to the expected further decline in tax and social security revenue collection.
The extreme poverty rate is expected to increase from 15% to  18.3% of the population, while social
expenditures financed by regional govemments (general education, public health, social assistance) are
predicted  to decrease by about 15%.
5.  The peak of the crisis is expected to come next year. In the short term,  supplies of food and
pharmaceuticals  are expected to  experience problems, but these problems can be solved without any
major new Western assistance beyond deliveries already promised. As opposed to this, the medium-term
consequences  of the shock will require additional actions.
6.  First, expenditures with high externalities on social assistance, primary schools, and health activities
(such as immunization and protecting children from an irreversible adverse impact of the crisis) should
have a priority. Second, the social protection system needs to be restructured with three objectives in
mind: (i) radical improvement in targeting of government provided social assistance; (ii) strengthening
the delivery of social assistance and social services by building a supplementary delivery mechanism of
a social fund-type  to deal with issues ranging from extreme cases of social destitution, to other assistance
measures that meet the needs of beneficiaries; and (iii) setting up or strengthening programs that can
facilitate enterprise restructuring and downsizing, if needed, by providing an adequate social safety net
for displaced  workers.
ii7.  Financing of expenditures which are absolutely necessary could come from within the  social
protection system, primarily from turning the untargeted part of subsidies for housing and related utility
services into a targeted benefit focused on the poorest. Those subsidies account for more than 3% of
GDP. The federal government should use its fiscal leverage to impose conditions on federal transfers.
and take the leadership in promoting  the reform agenda.
8.  The targeting  system requires  a  fundamental overhaul.  In  Russia, because  of  the  enormous
difference between reported income and consumption (attributable to the unofficial market), traditional
means-testing  methodologies do  not  work.  This  is  why  the  government  has  wisely  supported
developments of a new approach on an experimental basis. The difference between what households
actually consume and the official income they report (either to a survey interviewer or a social worker),
is  central to  the  three pilot methodologies that  have  been  introduced experimentally in the  Komi
Republic, and in Volgograd and Voronezh oblasts.  Each of these methodologies aims to estimate the
potential household consumption based  on  measurable indicators, and to  use  this  consumption to
determine eligibility for social assistance. The successful implementation of the three different targeting
systems in three very different oblasts of Russia demonstrates that significant progress can be made. It is
imperative to extend the experience of the pilots to those regions which could benefit quickly from
improved targeting methods and ultimately to implement the new approach nationwide.
8.  Strengthening  the delivery of social assistance and social services is difficult to impossible without
an environment which (i) favors a clear sharing of responsibility between the federation, the regions and
the  local  level  structures  (raion,  municipalities, NGOs);  (ii)  encourages the  participation of  the
population and local level institutions in the delivery of services; and (iii) ensures adequate control and
accountability in the use of funds, while channeling those funds rapidly to finance visible activities that
help the poor and vulnerable groups. To foster such an environment, it is advised to complement the
existing delivery system with a social fund-type mechanism. This has been implemented successfully in
some  former  Central  and  Eastern  European  countries  and  CIS  republics. Such  a  mechanism is
particularly  suitable for financing priorities that  are identified by  municipalities, local associations,
NGOs or local administrations, including high priority  rehabilitation of local infrastructure such as
sanitation systems, schools, and roads or other types of public works. The social-fund mechanism could
also be a helpful tool to address the problem of institutionalized children, and to complement existing
state outreach programs for pensioners living alone and for the handicapped outside institutions.
9.  The adjustrnent of employment to output has  been much smaller in Russia than  in Central and
Eastern  Europe. There are several reasons for  that: (i)  insider privatization which makes managers
unwilling to engage in firing old workers and hiring new ones (ii)  the lack of an adequate social safety
net  for  displaced workers in Russia, and, as a  result,  (iii)  unwillingness of  creditor firms, utility
companies and the federal government  to insist on payments of tax and credit arrears, for the fear of the
consequences of bankruptcy.  Losing a job means not only receiving a low unemployment benefit, but
often also losing many benefits which  have traditionally been supplied by  the firm. Moreover, the
current decentralized system of unemployment  benefits provision (which prevents surplus funds in some
regions to be used in deficit regions) strengthens regional disparities in the  level of unemployment
assistance and does not facilitate  job  search. The government should aim at centralizing provision of
unemployment benefits and increasing their level; as well as setting up special severance pay schemes
whereby workers would be eligible for one-off payments conditional upon enterprise restructuring or
closure.
iii10.  As the peak of the crisis is expected to come in about 12 months, rather than  now, additional
financing of social needs from the Bank could be provided in the time frame that fits the envisaged
scenario. The additional Bank resources should focus on those areas and locations where the Bank can
(i) at least moderately influence  resource allocations to social protection and social investment needs; (ii)
foster  experiments in new designs of  social assistance targeting, that  stand a  chance of  providing
increased protection and can provide a sounder basis for long-term reform. These are relatively modest
objectives, but still with significant risk of failure  in view of serious economy-wide problems and
uncertainties in Russia.
11.  The Bank's contribution,  therefore, to additional government actions should take four forms: (i) the
Social  Protection Adjustment Loan  third  tranche  has  been  restructured to  incorporate important
conditionalities related to minimum benefits and crisis alleviation; (ii) implementation assistance to the
ongoing reforms should be continued, and (iii) a new Local Social Protection Delivery Project, focused
on the new and tested targeting mechanism, and on building an effective and efficient social assistance
and social services delivery mechanism, should be developed as quickly as possible. These actions are
critical to protect the poor as the crisis has left Russia with extremely limited resources to deal with
poverty and social exclusion. For the more distant future, when adjustment lending to Russia is fully
restored and the reforrn program accelerates, the Bank could consider a fourth action, in the form of
direct assistance in financing severance pay to strengthen the social safety net for workers laid off during
major enterprise restructuring. Such assistance could start with some local governments, focusing on
regions  willing  to  accelerate  privatization  and  enterprise  restructuring  as  part  of  an  enhanced
environment  for private sector investment.
12.  The social impact of the crisis is going to be different for different people living in various places. It
will particularly affect those in small towns and rural areas and in families with many children. The
disaggregation of social impacts region by region is vital for determining what types of responses should
be designed and funded, and how programs should adapt if local conditions change. Also, as highlighted
in the analysis of crises elsewhere, including East Asia, more effort should be invested in understanding
the  relationships between political structures-at  central,  regional  and  local levels-and  effective
reforms. This requires that international and donor organizations take more steps towards expanding
their relationship with the regional and local governments and with civil society organizations, both for
policy dialogue and for research on social impacts. It also requires that stakeholders  at the local level, the
ultimate beneficiaries, are  brought on  board more than  ever  in shaping responses to  the problems
emerging for them.
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viCHAPTER  1: PRE-CRISIS  VULNERABILITIES,  POVERTY  AND INEQUALITY
1.1  The August 17, 1998 crisis stopped the period of recovery of the Russian economy that started in
1997. The crisis was related to pre-existing vulnerabilities. In the labor and social protection area there
were three crucial handicaps: (i) the lack of enterprise restructuring and continued support of unviable
enterprises, with  wage  and  transfers  arrears  becoming a  modem  counterpart of  shortages  under
communism; (ii) high and increasing poverty and rising inequality, and (iii) inefficiency of the social
protection system and the shortcomings of the state benefits delivery system resulting in huge arrears and
growing  number of barter transactions.
LABOR  MARKET  PECULIARITIES
1.2  Important impediments to the social protection system reform are related to the peculiarities of
the  Russian labor  market. In  Russia, in contrast to  many Central and  Eastern  European countries,
employment reduction has  lagged far  behind declines  in  output and  labor hoarding has  increased.
Growing wage arrears  (see  Annex Table  2), wage payments in  kind, and  a real  decline  in wages
(currently 50% of 1991 levels) have been the main modes of labor market adjustment to declines in real
output, as opposed to quantity adjustment in the number employed. Employment has decreased from 75
million in 1990  to 64 million in September 1998 (by 14%),  while GDP fell simultaneously by more than
40%. Many workers have been forced to take administrative leaves (16%  in  1996). Although open
unemployment  measured  by  surveys  reached  over  9%  in  1997  (Annex  Table  1),  registered
unemployment  was only 3.2%, reflecting low levels of benefit (in the second quarter of 1998,  the ratio of
average benefit  to average wage was 30%), and growing arrears in  benefit payments.
1.3  Those trends, indicating limited enterprise restructuring and  insufficient labor shedding, are
related to the dominance of insiders among shareholders of Russian enterprises-a  result of the voucher
privatization of  the  early  1990s. Goldberg and  Desai  (1998) report  that  50-60%  of the  shares of
enterprises are in the hands of insiders, employees and managers. Under these circumstances, managers
have much less leeway to  adjust the workforce because their decisions are liable to be blocked by
company boards. Several other factors contribute to the reluctance of managers to lay off workers: the
manager's  own  position  may  be  jeopardized;  managers  feel  a  sense  of  paternalism  and  social
responsibility towards their workers; they often hope for an increase in demand for their products; and
they want to avoid high separation costs. There is some evidence that managers are avoiding separation
costs by making selective use of wage arrears to force surplus workers to leave "voluntarily."
1.4  Employees  themselves are reluctant to leave formal enterprise rolls, even when they are involved
in the informal economy, when they have been forcibly placed on administrative leave, and when they
have no recourse to obtain payment of accumulating wage arrears. This is not surprising, given the low
levels of unemployment benefits and severance pay, and the arrears in benefit payment, which mean that
workers who would leave, or who would be laid off, have no effective protection. At the same time, they
are able to use their insider power to stay on the rolls. As a result, Russian enterprises settle for formal
employment levels far above the efficient level. The fact that the labor code has not been reformed since
the  transition  started,  and  contains  several  unrealistic  protective  measures,  does  not  encourage
compliance  even with those articles which should be complied with under any circumstances (see Box I
1on legal provisions  and reality in Russian enterprises).  At the  same time federal and regional governments
are  not  interested  in enforcing  timely  payments  of taxes  and  other  financial  obligations  by enterprises,
since this  would lead to layoffs which would  shift the  burden of  social protection  to the  government.  As a
result, so called soft-budget constraint persists (Buckberg and Pinto, 1998)
1.5  An additional  peculiarity  of the  labor market  in Russia  is the  legacy of  Soviet policy  to promote
labor migration  to the North by creating  permanent  populations  resident  in large urban settlements  rather
than relying  on smaller, more temporary  populations  (as in other countries).  This practice has led to many
more people  residing  in the Russian  North than  in comparable  Northern  countries elsewhere.  The current
large population  is in increasing  need of assistance  for outmigration.
Box 1: Legal Provisions And Reality In The Russian Labor  Market
In the Russian transition to market, workers pay a heavy toll. Beside suffering substantial hardship imposed by the fall in
earnings, their workplace rights are often violated. But they have little recourse to legal actions. Pervasive wage arrears are but
one blatant example of violations of the labor code. Indeed, most of the 1.2 million cases of violation of working  rights brought
to Russian courts in 1997 were wage- related. The fact that the majority of these cases were solved in favor of the workers was
of little avail, because there is no enforcement  mechanism to impose court decisions. In fact, studies  show that managers  - to
avoid the costs of severance payments imposed by layoffs - apply wage arrears selectively, concentrating  on workers who they
view redundant, with the intent to induce their voluntar, separation. Other violations of the labor code include non-payments  for
overtime work and vacations; exposure to hazardous working conditions; and irregularities  regarding separation  of workers.
The breakdown of meaningful  norms is best illustrated by the minimum wage regulations. The issue is not that high inflation
has long eroded its value, currently set at 83 rubles, which is less than $5 (using exchange rate as of mid-November),  but that
minimum wage regulations  are not obeyed, since wage arrears make the real minimum wage a fraction of labor code provisions.
In spite of this, the relative incidence of strikes (in terms of days lost in strikes per number of workers) is many times lower in
Russia than in countries of OECD. As a sign that workers are increasingly willing to defend their rights, the relative incidence of
strikes has been increasing in recent years. While in 1992 only 27 days per 1,000 workers were lost in strikes,  the figure rose to
92 days by 1997.
POVERTY  AND INEQUALITY
1.6  Poverty  in Russia  has  increased throughout  the  1990s.  If calculated  on the  basis of the  Russian
Longitudinal  Monitoring  Survey  (RLMS),  more than  one-third  of Russian  households,  comprising  some
43%  of  the  population,  consumed  less than  the  official  subsistence  minimum  in  1996  (Table  1)'.  The
increase  in  poverty  is  a  result  of  a  decline  in  real  income,  and  also  of  growing  inequality  in  the
distribution  of  income  and  expenditures.  Both  the  level  and  growth of  income  inequality  in  Russia
exceed  comparators  in transition  countries  (see Table 2).
1.7  To match  the  policy  orientation  of the  report,  we  focus  the  analysis  on  extreme  poverty-those
who  live in households  where less than 50% of the official  subsistence  minimum  is consumed.  To denote
those  individuals  and households  we will use the term  "very poor".  By this  stringent  measure,  15% of the
population  were very poor in 1996 (Table  1).
I Alternative quantitative estimates of poverty based on the Russian federation Goskomstat  household  survey
estimates  that 21-23 percent of households  are receiving  average  per capita monetary  income  below subsistence
minimum.  The Goskomstat  survey, however,  suffers  from sampling  problems.
2Table 1. Russia: RLMS-based  Extreme Poverty1/ And Poverty2/ Measures, 1994-1996
(In percent  of population/individuals)3/
Extreme  Poverty  Rate  Poverty Gap  Poverty Gap
1/  (million Rubles)  (% of GDP)
Poverty
Rate
1994  11.4  37.6  24.6  4
1995  12.9  39.6  27.2  1.7
1996  15.0  43.1  31.1  1.4
In percent of  households
1994  9.4  32.2
1995  10.4  33.7
1996  12.5  37.1
Source: Staff calculations  from World Bank version of RLMS data base
11 Extreme poverty: households with consumption less than 50 percent of the official subsistence minimum.
2/ Poverty: households with consumption less than the official subsistence minimum.
3/  Grossed up to population level by multiplying households times household size in each round.  Poverty rate thus
measured is higher than on a per household basis because poorer households are larger on average than non-poor
households.
1.8  Extreme (and potentially  long-term) poverty  in  Russia is  increasingly associated with  the
following characteristics: residence outside the only growth areas of the country (e.g. outside Moscow/St.
Petersburg/Nizhniy  Novgorod, the European Russia corridor);  low education, entrepreneurial ability or
occupational skills; lack of private land or ability to access private land; and unemployment. However,
because of pervasive wage arrears and low salaries in some parts of the public sector, extreme poverty is
not confined to those without a job.  Recent studies indicate a growing incidence of poverty among
workers with unpaid wages (Desai and Idson, 1998). The particular vulnerability of children is a matter of
increasing concern. Households with a large number of dependents are the most likely to be poor and
RLMS data confirm  that the birth of a child to a family in "normal circumstances" substantially increases
the risk of poverty. Births in 1994 and 1995 were associated with poverty status in 1996.  The incidence of
poverty among pensioners indicates vulnerability of lonely urban pensioners, most of whom are women.
1.9  The hardship imposed on workers by non-payment of wages has led them to seek secondary paid
jobs in the formal sector as well as to engage in informal sector activity. Families have also survived
through transfers from friends and relatives, and/or through home production of food both for their own
consumption and  for  sale,  using  gardening plots. The most  extreme poverty  is  liable to  occur  in
households  without the necessary contacts, skills or resources to realize any of these coping strategies.
Table 2:  Russia: Changes  In Inequality During The Transition Compared




Russia  24  39
Poland  26  28
Hungary  21  23
Estonia  23  35
Source: Milanovic (1998 a, p. 41) and Goskomstat data.  Calculated from the countries' household  budget surveys
(Goskomstat  surveys for Russia)
3FAILURE To  REACH THE POOR
1.10  The lack of an effective safety net-one  that is responsive to economic crisis and can facilitate
restructuring-has  limited the ability of the country to deal with growing poverty. A close look at the
social assistance system in a narrow sense, that is at the system whose specific function is poverty
alleviation, illustrates the weakness of the social protection system in reaching the poor2.  Effective
targeting of social assistance depends both on  the rules that  govern it and  on the  ability of  social
assistance offices to implement the rules. In both these respects, several key problems are found with the
existing system in Russia.
1.11  First, the Russian social assistance system was originally designed not to alleviate poverty but to
provide  several small benefits  to  defined categories of  the  population,  such as the  disabled. This
categorical approach to allocation of benefits still tends to prevail and excludes many of the new poor,
such as large families and the work-capable  unemployed. Second, since 1994, social assistance benefits
have increasingly not been paid or, if paid at all, have been paid in kind. In a highly decentralized social
assistance system, this failure to make payments has reflected both the fiscal squeeze and the collapse of
official delivery mechanisms. Third, the overall level of social assistance-amounting  to about 4% of the
poverty gap in 1994 (Milanovic, 1998 b)-would  have been inadequate even with effective targeting.
Finally, the performance of the system in targeting benefits to the poorest households has been extremely
weak by any standards, including those of other transition economies.
1.12  These deficiencies are documented  in the report by Milanovic (1998 b), based on 1993-94  RLMS
data. The average benefit per household  per month amounted to only about US$ 5, both for poor and non-
poor households. The distribution of social assistance was almost entirely flat, with 13% of the poor and
13% of the non-poor receiving social assistance benefits. The proportion of total  social  assistance
expenditure which went to recipients who should not have qualified on poverty criteria (the "leakage" in
monetary  terms) amounted to almost two thirds.
1.13  Russia's social assistance system has been extremely ineffective in reaching the poor, as judged
not only by principles of social assistance, but also by the practice of other transition economies (Table
3). In terms of efficiency of the system, only 8% of total social assistance in Russia was distributed to the
lowest decile of the population, compared with 20-27% in Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria and 35% in
Estonia. Performance in targeting assistance to the poorest households, as measured by the concentration
coefficient of social assistance, is also very weak in Russia compared with other transition economies (the
more negative the coefficient, the more is social assistance,  in absolute terms, targeted towards the
poorest households).
2 For the purpose  of this chapter  the definition  of social  assistance  is very  rigorous,  following  Milanovic  (1998b).  It
is any assistance  that is left after pensions,  child allowances,  fuel allowances,  housing  allowances,  unemployment
benefits,  and student  stipends  are subtracted. A more widely  applied definition  would include  child, fuel, and
housing  allowances.
4Table  3: The Performance  Of The Social Assistance  System In Russia And In Other Transition
Economies, 1993-94
Effective Percentage of Social Assistance  Concentration
Received by the Lowest Decile  Coefficient
Russia  8.2  8.2
Hungary  27.2  -25.8
Estonia  34.7  -16.2
Poland  20.5  -19.8
Bulgaria  22.3  -13.8
Source: Milanovic (1998 b, p. 38).
1.14  As with social assistance benefits, pensions have also been distributed relatively equally across
the  population. Nevertheless, the net  impact of all  public transfers, including child  allowances, fuel
allowances, student stipends and unemployment benefits, has been somewhat equalizing (Annex Table
10).
INFORMAL  ECONOMY
1.15  Informal labor market has played an important role in Russia in 1  990s. Its development  allowed
for a  partial offset  of the  consequences of the  income fall. The informal sector helped to  develop
entrepreneurship, increase employment, and  channel  resources to  more  productive activities.  The
informal sector development ought to be seen as a desirable feature of transition to a market economy.
The informal sector increased in all the transition economies in the 1990s (see Table 4).
1.16  However, both the size and the nature of informal arrangements in Russia are a  source of
concern. The share of the informal activities, as measured by Johnson, Kaufinann and Shleifer had been
growing fast and reached almost 42% in 1995 (Table 4). This amounts to a huge revenue loss, since by
definition the informal sector does not pay taxes. At the same time in Central and Eastern Europe the
initial growth in the share of the  informal sector  was stabilized and then  the  informal sector got
"formalized"  and started paying taxes. The stabilization took place in 1992-1994 when the enterprise
reforms began to generate positive microeconomic adjustmnents  as a result of which previously informal
activities moved into the formal sector.
1.17  In terms of the nature of the informal sector, the reason for concern is that informal arrangements
in Russia can hardly be distinguished from formal ones. State firms are  simultaneously engaged in both.
Employees are engaged in the informal labor market, while staying on their formal jobs with unpaid, or
delayed, wages. This is one of the biggest impediments  to the healthy development of the informal sector.
Formal  and  informal sector are  not  focused on  their comparative advantages, and  informal  sector
entrepreneurs do not have incentives to  get formalized when they grow in scale. As a  consequence,
building a modern social  protection system is difficult.
Table 4: Informal Sector in Russia and in Other Transition Economies
1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995
Czech R  6  6.7  12.9  16.9  16.9  17.6  11.3
Estonia  12  19.9  26.2  25.4  24.1  25.1  11.8
Hungaiy  27  28  32.9  30.6  28.5  27.7  29
Lithuania  12  11.3  21.8  39.2  1  31.7  28.7  21.6
Poland  15.7  19.6  23.5  19.7  18.5  15.2  12.6
Russia  12  14.7  23.5  32.8  36.7  40.3  41.6
Source: Johnson, Kaufmann,  and Shleifer (1997)
5CHAPTER 2:  THE SOCIAL IMPACT OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
2.1  The crisis which hit  Russia in August 1998 affected first and foremost not the poorest, but
bondholders, shareholders, and those who had substantial ruble-denominated savings. The value of all
financial instruments tumbled with the Moscow Times dollar index in October 1998 only 25% of its 1994
value. Exchange rate collapsed and ruble lost more than  100% of its dollar value in one month, and
almost 200% in the period August 1998- February 1999,  when the exchange rate stabilized at the level of
about 23 rubles, compared with 7.9 in August 1998.
2.2  However, the crisis spread quickly to wage earners with no or limited savings. Inflation
accelerated from 0.2% in July 1998,  through 3.7% in August, and almost 40% in September,  before in
went down to 8.5% in January 1999  and 4.1% in February 1999.  The overall consumer price increase
between July and December was 77%. Average nominal wage, however, increased by only 26% in the
same period, indicating a fall in real wages by about 30% (see Table 5). Minimum wage did not change.
Table  5: Monthly  Trends in Prices,  Wages  and Exchange  Rate July  1998-February  1999
July  1998  August  September  October  November  December  January  February
1998  1998  1998  1998  1998  1999  1999
Price
change
(percent to  0.2  3.7  38.4  4.5  5.7  11.6  8.5  4.1
previous
month)
Average  1,099  1,047  1,098  1,110  1,148  1,390
wage  (in
rubles)
Exchange  6.22  6.78  14.41  15.91  16.45  20.07  22.25  22.90
rate
(rbUdol)
2.3  This income drop is expected to have lasting consequences. GDP per capita in Russia, which
dropped by 4.6% in 1998, as a result of  post-August developments, is expected to drop further by 8.3%
in 1999 which will lead to a cumulative drop of 13% in 1998-99 (see Annex Table 1). Correspondingly,
the beginning of 2000 is expected to be the most difficult period in Russia. Average standards of living
will reach the low point, before expected stabilization in 2000 and recovery afterwards. Four aspects are
of particular importance: (i) the effect of the GDP fall on the poor, (ii) the possible crisis in food, fuel,
and pharrnaceuticals provision, and (iii) the possible effect of the GDP fall on social expenditures, and
(iv) the role of the informal sector as a cushion to the crisis. Those aspects are examined below.
6EFFECT  ON THE POOR
2.4  To assess the impact of the crisis on the poor, the effect of three economic scenarios is simulated
under alternate assumptions regarding changes in the distribution of income. In the baseline scenario, the
drop in income is assumed to be distributed evenly across all income groups, i.e. no change in income
distribution. The second scenario assumes that the decline in income falls disproportionately  on the poor
(16.8% decline for the poor and 8.4% for the non-poor). In the third scenario, the fall in income has a
disproportionately greater impact on the non-poor (15.5% decline for the non-poor and 7.75% for the
poor). All the scenarios are static in that it was assumed that households are not able to change their
behavior or adapt to the new conditions.  This assumption is only tenable for the short run; in the long run,
households will adapt and adopt coping behaviors that might lead eventually to improved consumption.
The main findings of the analysis for 1998-99  are described below.
2.5  In the first scenario, where the decline in income is equally distributed, an additional 3.3%
of the  population would become very poor (additional 6% overall poor), amounting to a 20%
increase in extreme poverty (Table 6).  Severe welfare declines can be expected for the  poor and
especially for the very poor, as falling real incomes combine with failing services and likely worsening
social conditions. If it is further assumed  that the overall 12% income decline will fall more on those who
are just below the poverty line, the number of those extremely poor would increase even more, to  19.4%
of the population (a gain of 4.4 percentage points or a 29% increase in the number of the very poor).
Even scenarios which are somewhat more favorable to the very poor, where the decline in income falls
disproportionately  on the non-poor, still result in 17.1% extremely poor-not  a great deal better than the
baseline scenario of 18.3%..
2.6  Family composition  of the very poor is not expected to change significantly from the pattern
found in 1996. Families with dependents will continue to be much more poor than households without
(Annex Table 5). Households with either children or children and elderly comprise more than 75% of the
very poor but only 41% of the non-poor.
2.7  Location.  Locational factors are also fairly constant. Only 3% of the poor live in the major
metropolitan areas (Moscow and St. Petersburg), which in tum account for  11-12% of the non-poor
(Annex Table 6).  The largest groups of poor and non-poor are found in other urban areas (large and
small towns).  Extreme poverty is more a rural phenomenon, as rural areas account for 27% of the non-
poor but 43-44% of the very poor.
2.8  Children will continue to account for a disproportionate share of the poor. So many households
with children were already poor,  before the  August financial crisis,  that there will not be dramatic
increases in head counts for these categories. However, the risk of extreme poverty increases with each
subsequent child (unlike when adding elderly members). Furthermore,  children face additional problems
besides a higher risk of extreme poverty, including the risk of long term or irreversible effects of deficits
in early childhood development (see Box 3).
2.9  Unemployment will remain strongly associated with poverty (Annex Table 9).  In previous
research on poverty in Russia, actual unemployment was found to be highly correlated with poverty.
Almost one-fourth of households  have at least one unemployed in the household.
7Box 2: Children's Vulnerability To Poverty
Overall, children face a risk of poverty which is higher than other social groups, including  the elderlv. This result should not be
surprising, since children are not able to participate in the labor market to earn income, and they do not have stocks of human,
physical, and social capital which many of the elderly have accumulated. Information available  from 1996 demonstrates  that the
poverty rate for households with children is much higher than for non-child households, and the probability that the household
will become  poor if there is an additional child is 13%. This effect of an additional  child was the largest in an absolute sense out
of all the various factors which were associated with increasing or decreasing the probabilitv that the household was poor.  For
example, an additional elderly member in the household decreased the chance of the household being poor by 2% (Poverty,
1998).
In the RLMS data base, about 6% of households reported a birth in 1995 and again in 1996. Of the births reported in 1995, 62%
of the families with a newborn were poor.  This improved somewhat in 1996, when 54% of famnilies  with a newborn were poor.
Although the number of cases are too low for further statistical analysis, they are suggestive of the shock towards poverty that is
associated with a birth.
Table 6.  Russia: Extreme  Povertyl  Scenarios,  1998-1999
(In percent of populationlindividuals)  2/
Povey  scenario  Extreme  Poverty Rate
Baseline  15.0
Flat 12 Percent Decline  18.3
Poor Lose More  19.4
Rich Lose More  17.1
Memorandum  Items
Percent Change  from Baseline
Flat 12  Percent Decline  22.0
Poor Lose More  29.3
Rich Lose More  14.0
Source: Author calculations from World Bank version of RLMS data base.
1/ Extreme poverty: households with consumption less than 50 percent of the official subsistence  minimum
2/  Grossed  up to population level by multiplying households times household size in each round. Poverty  rate thus measured is
higher than on a per household basis because poorer households are larger on average than non-poor  households.
FOOD, FUEL AND PHARMACEUTICALS
2.10  Food. The Russian financial crisis has occurred at a time when the Russian harvest is lower than
average, and when international commodity prices have fallen relative to peaks in 1996. The low harvest
and internal  economic disruption have led to concern that poor people in particular  regions of Russia may
experience  hunger this year. In reality, however:
*  The harvest shortfall is serious, but not catastrophic.  Production estimates are probably biased
downward, as producers and surplus regions resort to hoarding.  Even if the grain crop is as low as
officially estimated (47 million metric tons), food grain needs of approximately 21-25 million
metric tons are covered.
*  Aggregate supply is sufficient to maintain an average diet comparable to that in many middle
income countries.  Particular groups, however, are sharply affected by the increase in food prices
and by the disruption of traditional patterns of distribution. Affected groups include the politically
vocal  major  cities  traditionally dependent  on  imports, and  increasing numbers of  the  poor
8everywhere.  The poor in traditional deficit areas will be most affected (Far North, Urals, Far
East), since prices there will rise most.
*  Targeted assistance to help poor people maintain adequate nutrition is an essential part of the
social agenda for the duration of the crisis.
*  Low commodity prices have led food producers in major exporting countries (particularly the U.S.
and European Union) to lobby successfully for food aid for Russia.
2.11  Fuel.  The fuel potential problem is a reflection of major issues that the Russian energy sector is
facing due to natural monopoly effects, the need to improve the government regulatory framework, and
the persistence of non-monetary means of exchange including mutual settlements, monetary surrogates
and barter payments. The situation is made particularly acute by the drop in monetary revenues of
regional and federal budgets that may lead to interruption in the supply of energy and related supplies of
electricity in certain regions. The problem is particularly serious in Russian Northern territories that
depend heavily on seasonal shipments during the short months of river and sea navigation. Current and
reliable information is not available-the  Northern territories are supplied through different channels and
a comprehensive assessment is difficult to make. Fuel shortages aggravated by the financial crisis are
currently evident in Kamchatka peninsula, which has  no  local sources of energy.  The Ministry of
Regional Policies  and  the  Ministry  of Emergency Situations has  undertaken a  tour  of  potentially
vulnerable places, and is planning emergency measures to supply these territories. However, the funding
for these activities may prove to be insufficient.
2.12  Pharmaceuticals. Three phenomena have occurred since August: (i) sudden increases in drug
prices; (ii)  shortages in drug supplies in health facilities and retail establishments;  and (iii) non-payment
of wages to health personnel.
*  Increase in drug prices.  The weakened exchange rate has had a significant impact on drug prices.
65% of drugs sold in the country are imported and 90% of substances used in local manufacturing are
also imported. It is difficult to get good estimates of exactly how much prices have increased (there
are thousands of drugs on the market and wholesalers and retailers have different pricing strategies in
different regions) but all sources of information (the MOH, our contacts in the regions, other donors
and NGOs) confirm that price increases have been substantial. These price increases, combined with
declining public sector resources and private incomes, have severely limited purchasing capacity in
health facilities and for private out-of-pocket purchasing of drugs.  There are demand- and supply-
side  inefficiencies in the drug market that can only be corrected through long-term restructuring
measures.  In  the  short  run,  the  most  appropriate  intervention would  be  targeted  emergency
humanitarian assistance (drug supplies) to  alleviate the  shock and  buy time  for  adjustments in
consumption levels and more selective use of drugs.
*  Drug shortages.  There is no generalized country-wide drug emergency today, although there are
serious shortages in some regions and for some drugs.  That is, drugs are available in the market to
those who have the money to buy them.  The Ministry of Health estimates that there are 3-4 months'
supply of drugs available in  local stocks.  Initially, there was little movement of stocks due to
liquidity problems  caused  by  the  banking  crisis  and  accumulated debts  to  suppliers.  While
manufacturers and wholesalers used to sell drugs mostly on credit, this practice has been largely
replaced by "up-front" cash sales.  The situation improved somewhat in mid-September with the
stabilization  of the ruble at around 15 Rb to the dollar, as funds and drugs started to trickle back into
the market. The system will probably continue to struggle on at a "low functional level" for as long as
9the exchange rate remains stable. If the exchange rate worsens then drugs may again stop flowing in
the market, at least while further adjustments are made.
Non-payment of wages. This problem predated the crisis, but has been exacerbated by more budget
shortages.
Box 3: Magadan and Vorkuta:  serious problems but no shortages
Bank  staff  visited  Magadan  and  Vorkuta  after  press  reports  on food  and pharmaceuticals  shortages  there.  Contrary  to those
reports,  supplies  of food  and  medicines  are good.  In Magadan  prices  are  not administratively  controlled.  There  are 31 suppliers
of drugs  to the oblast,  only  I of which  is a state  company,  the rest are  private  and officially  licensed.  The  most  pressing  social
issues  are:  (i) insufficient  provision  of food containing  vitamins  to institutionalized  care;  (ii)  the lack  of sufficient  financing  to
provide  free  drugs  to all eligible  individuals,  and  (iii) inability  to provide  social  services  to needy  people  in remote  areas.  In
Vorkuta,  there  is  price  regulation  of food  and medicines.  Although  there  are  no shortages,  the choice  of providers  and the
selection  of goods  are  more  limited.
SOCIAL  EXPENDITURES
2.13  As  a result of falling incomes and  GDP, social expenditures from the  federal and  regional
budgets are also going to fall in 1999. Given that the revenue drop can reasonably be expected to exceed
the  income drop,  as revenues react more  than  proportionally to  income falls, the  effect  on  social
expenditures may be significant. Also, most of social expenditures are financed out of regional and local
revenues.  While the federal government may have some space for maneuver to offset the effects of the
revenue fall, it is unlikely to be the case for subnational governments.
2.14As a result the largest declines in expenditures in real terms are likely to take place in education,
health, and social assistance. In education, the highest reduction would take place in expenditures on
general education,  which is almost entirely financed out of the regional budgets.  For the same reason in
health, the brunt of cuts would be borne  by primary services. In social assistance, the most affected
transfers would be child allowances, that are entirely financed by  the regions (even though they are
mandated federally). Consequently,  the decline in social expenditures in real terms is expected  to exceed
the 13% income drop, and the share of social expenditures in GDP would fall. Also, transfer payments,
often delayed in the past, are likely to remain in arrears, further compromising the effectiveness of the
safety net.
2.1  SThe  problem  may  be  aggravated  by  the  Ministry  of  Finance  using  budget  sequestration.
Sequestration has lead to particularly sharp cuts  in intergovernmental transfers  already during 1998,
reducing the regional fiscal capacity to  support social expenditures.  The  1999 budget provides for
transfers of 14% of federal tax revenues less customs, but these are highly likely to come under severe
pressure in the event of worsening budget performance, much as happened in  1998.  Disproportionate
cuts  in  transfers  could bring this  figure down  significantly, and  weaken the  capacity of transfer
dependent regions in particular to provide vital social services.  Regions facing severe budget pressures
are likely to prioritize payment of the public wage bill at the expense of non-wage inputs to  service
provision, compromising  welfare assistance and quality of education and health care in particular.
2.16It  is important to  recognize that the  effect of the  crisis on social expenditures will be  heavily
differentiated across regions. The richest regions (13 region-donors) are likely to be able to offset the
income drop better than the federal government, while the  15 poorest regions, that depend on federal
transfers for more than 50% of their total spending, will be unable to do this at all. Therefore the income
and  revenue crisis is expected to  increase already large income disparities in Russia. The reduced
10intergovernmental transfers  will  disproportionately affect  poorer  regions.  Moreover, intra-regional
transfers are also likely to be reduced, which increases the risk to under financing vital social services of
local governments  (where most provision actually takes place).
2.17The additional squeeze  on  expenditures may  come  from a  further  increase  in  informal  sector
activities and a growth in the barter system, fostering the virtual economy.  This was clearly already
happening in the first months of crisis (see Box 4). As Gaddy and Ickes (1998ab) point out in a recent
paper on  the  Russian economy, the  current system effectively  camouflages the  existence of value
reducing enterprises in the  economy, and  leads to  an equilibrium in  which nobody  is interested in
breaking the virtual cycle. The post-August  reality may strengthen those tendencies.
Box 4: Offsets On The Rise
On November 20, Reuters reports the case of a friend of a depositor who has frozen deposits in the SBS-Agro Bank. The bank is
on the verge of Bankruptcy. The friend has expectation of receiving past wages and needs a car. He strikes a deal with the
depositor. The depositor will buy a car from a company that has outstanding debts to the bank. The car company in turn 'pays'
the Bank, which credits the account of the depositor. Thus, the friend gets the car, the car company sells its car, the depositor
obtains cash against his frozen deposit, and the bank settles its obligations.
1~1CHAPTER 3: WHAT CAN AND SHOULD BE DONE?
3.1  The crisis should be used as an opportunity to press ahead with necessary reforms. Something
can be learned from successes and failures in responding to crises in Latin America and East Asia (see
Box 5). Public action can make a difference in the following domains:
* the design of economy-wide policies
* the policy and institutional framework  for labor markets
* the creation of a new community-based  delivery mechanism of social services and public works
* the targeting of social assistance
Box 5: What  Can  Russia  Learn From  The  Experience  Elsewhere?
First and foremost, solving social problems means putting them very high on the agenda; something which has not happened so
far in the short historv of Russia's transition. The key lesson from other regions  is that  targeting is  crucial and that  if
government-run schemes cannot target well, there is a lot of merit in setting up special funds  Those special finds,  if well-
targeted (as in the case of Chile's public works program which set wages low enough to ensure that the most needy were the
main participants) have been successful in cushioning the social costs of economic adjustment measures. When the govermnent
lacks the cohesion or resources to make a standard social assistance program work,  social funds emerge as  a very useful
alternative. Most of the experience  has been in Latin America.
ECONOMY-WIDE POLICIES
3.2  The sharp drop predicted in domestic demand, approaching 13% in a two-year period, raises the
question of whether compensating expansionary policies help the poor. Such policies reduce investor
confidence, risk higher inflation, and lower future growth prospects. On the other hand, they can help the
poor and may be distributionally favorable if the expansion is moderate and not financed by increased
deficit. Lessons can be learned from Latin American and East Asian experience in this regard (see Box
6).
12Box 6: Could Economy-Wide Policies Help The Poor?
Expansionary policies cannot help the poor if they are financed by an increased deficit that leads to inflation. There is evidence
from the Philippines in the early 1980s, and Brazil from 1980 to the early 1990s, that the poor are the hardest hit by high
inflation. Although Russia should not aim to keep inflation close to zero, it cannot live successfully with prolonged double-digit
inflation. Real exchange rate depreciations  will undoubtedly help the poor in the long-run but short-term measures are essential
to cushion the effects of price increases. In the Russian circumstances,  given that the most severe poverty is rural, real exchange
rate  devaluation should encourage more  labor-intensive investment choices. However, this  will come  after a  period  of
adjustment. In East Asia, rice fanners in Thailand or smallholder export crop producers in Indonesia are benefiting from real
exchange rate depreciation. Financial sector bailouts are also of some relevance in Russia, despite the absence of microcredit and
other financial institutions operating in villages, given that Sberbank functions in almost all Russian small towns. There is a lot
which needs to be done in the area of institutional transparency and accountability, primarily because there is a major societal
concern in Russia about unfair or corrupt gains among the wealthy and connected. However, fostering open and accountable
public institutions will take time, because these issues are deeply linked to political structures and therefore not amnenable  to
technocratic solutions.
3.3  The biggest medium-term  challenge  for economy-wide  policies  is creating  the basis for economic
growth.  In the  short-term,  however,  the highest  priority  is to counteract  the  consequences  of the  expected
massive  fall in expenditures  on education,  health,  and social  assistance,  which  are  estimated  to amount  to
more  than  15%  in  real  terms.  These  expenditures  are  the  most  vulnerable  to  the  crisis  since  they  are
financed  by regional  budgets  which  are hit particularly  heavily  by the  crisis. In the case  of education,  it is
extremely  important  to preserve  real  spending  on primary  schools,  including  non-salary  spending.  This
should  come  from  reallocations  in regional  budgets  supported  by  selective  federal  interventions,  and
should  be  linked  to  the  restructuring  of  the  education  sector  to  eliminate  wasteful  expenditures.  In the
health  area,  a  particular  challenge  is  preservation  of  real  spending  on  health  activities  with  high
externalities,  such  as  vaccinations.  In  the  social  assistance  area,  the  need  for  much  better  targeting  of
expenditures  is more  pressing  than  ever.  This  will require  a significant  restructuring  of the  fragmented
system  of  entitlements  that  has  made  targeting  so  difficult.  An  overarching  rule should  be  to focus  on
protection  of  those  expenditures  (for  example  on  infant  nutrition  and  vaccinations)  which,  if  neglected,
could  lead to irreversible  declines.
3.4  Financing  of  expenditures  which  are  absolutely  necessary  could  come  from  within  the  social
protection  system,  primarily  from  turning  the  untargeted  part of  subsidies  for housing  and  related  utility
services  into a targeted  benefit  focused  on the  poorest.  Those  subsidies  account  for about  3.7%  of  GDP
(about  35%  of  municipal  budget  expenditures,  see  Freinkman,  1998).  The  housing  subsidy  should  be
replaced  by two  categories  of  expenditures:  (i)  maintenance  of the  1998 GDP  share  of  expenditures  on
primary  education,  basic health  and  social  assistance  at the  same  level, which  would  cost  1.9% of GDP
(1%  for primary  education,  0.6%  for health  and  0.3%  for social  assistance);  (ii) turning  the reminder  of
1.8% of GDP into a targeted  poverty benefit replacing  the array of currently  untargeted  benefits.
3.5  Increasing  disparities  are among  the  key  problems  of the  Russian  social  protection  system.  The
current  fiscal  crisis  is placing  an even greater  premium  on strengthening  federal revenue  performance  in
order  to  secure  a  program  with  the  IMF  and  eventually  return  to  international  creditworthiness.  The
1999 budget  has  aimed  to reverse the  move  towards  greater  regional  share of the  total public  budget  but
reducing  regional  tax sharing  allocations.  The VAT is to move  toward  85% federal  (from  current  75%)
this  year,  and  it is proposed  to move  it to  100% next year.  It is highly  unlikely  that  the  introduction  of
new sales taxes and  property  taxation  can compensate  for the loss to regional  budgets.  Moreover,  only a
small  number  of regions  can  presently  implement  sales  taxes,  and  initial  revenue  expectations  from  the
new tax are  very modest.  This  implies  a  shrinking  tax  base for regional  budgets,  which  may  add to the
13problem of the regional fiscal base shrinking more than the federal one. The key issue is, therefore, an
appropriate use of additional federal resources on the protection of indispensable  expenditures on health,
education, and social assistance, and on the promotion of targeted benefits.
3.6  The government should use it's fiscal leverage to impose conditions on transfers, and force the
reform agenda.  The most affected regions, however, are the least able to finance additional demands on
social spending.  They are also likely to be the regions with greatest need-- i.e. highest unemployment,
lowest per capita incomes, largest spending arrears relative to GDP, etc. As indicated above, targeting
benefits is likely to yield more improvement in the efficiency pf social expenditures than any other single
fiscal measure.  The Russian government is already implementing a program that involves in essence
divestiture of housing and social assets by enterprises onto municipal budgets, and implementation of a
phased cost recovery program to charge for these services (50% cost recovery for end 1998  was achieved
in all but about one dozen regions).  In turn municipal governments  are working to target assistance to
households that cannot afford to pay for higher service charges. Hence,  the idea of identifying the 'fat' in
the budget to be replaced by additional targeted benefits to avoid negative social consequences of ending
subsidies is already there and should be pursued more vigorously.
POLICY  AND  INSTITUTIONAL  FRAMEWORK  FOR  LABOR  MARKET  REFORM
3.7  The experience of successful transition economies shows that the main source of resumption of
job creation and economic growth in transition economies is a more productive use of existing resources
rather than  investment (Buckberg and Pinto,  1997). The reforms should free previously unproductive
resources for use in the productive parts of the economy by ceasing to subsidize the preservation of
unproductive  and  often  value-decreasing,  non-restructured parts.  In  the  case  of  other  transition
economies, e.g. Estonia, these steps led to a  dramatic simultaneous surge in the job creation and job
destruction rates. At the height of the restructuring of the Estonian economy in 1993, two thirds of both
separations and accessions were attributable to job destruction and job creation respectively (Haltiwanger
and Vodopivec, 1998).
3.8  As indicated in chapter 1, the first step in the process of labor  market modernization is doing
away with the dominance of insiders among shareholders. Only after this happens, the levels of
protection to laid off workers should be increased. Differences in safety net provisions for laid off
workers explain much of the difference in experience in labor market  restructuring  between Central and
Eastern Europe on the one hand, and Russia on the other hand.3 This should take either the form of
increased unemployment benefits,  provided federally, or special  federal severance pay schemes focused
on enterprises being restructured  or closed down .
3.9  Legal framework  The legal system in the Russian economy is very limited in its ability to
enforce the  law. As  such, reform of labor legislation is not the solution to the  immediate problem.
However, work on reforming the labor code, which essentially remains identical to the 1971 code (with
3This  observation  was made  by Blanchard,  1997.  In this study  we are trying  not to overemphasize  the safety  net
factor  by stressing  that  the hard  budget  constraint  has to come  first  or together  with  the improved  safety  net. When
the hard  budget  constraint  is present  it is possible  to invoke  labor  market  restructuring  even  in absence  of improved
provisions  for the unemployed,  as the example  of Estonia  shows.  However,  Estonia's  privatization  was not insider
privatization.  On the other  hand,  when  there  is insider  privatization  present,  or trade  unions  are powerful,  it seems
extremely  difficult to impose hard budget constraints  without corresponding  improvements  in unemployment
benefits/severance  pay arrangements,  as examples  from Central  and  Eastem  Europe  show.
14some revisions in 1992) is very important as it lays the groundwork for, and helps facilitate, the eventual
introduction of a market economy, and well-regulated market enforcement mechanisms.
3.10  The new labor code should pay particular attention to facilitating restructuring of enterprises by
promoting  job creation through reducing the costs of hiring and firing workers. For hiring policies, it will
be important to reduce excessive benefits associated with employment, as well as to eliminate current
restrictions on the use of fixed-term employment. The law need not define the conditions for fixed-term
work, nor prescribe the duration and maximum number of successive contracts. To facilitate layoffs and
firings, and therefore to stimulate new hires, the labor code should ease the conditions on firing, such as
use of current vacancies for re-hiring the worker if his/her current  job is no longer required, or the current
requirement for sign off by trade unions.
3.11  Unemployment  benefitslseverance  pay.  As  indicated  earlier,  the  current  system  of
unemployment benefits is inappropriate in several respects. First, the system fails to protect workers
adequately from falling into poverty on separation from employment. The average unemployment benefit
is currently only about 25% of the average wage, and it is uncertain whether there are enough resources
to pay it.  In fact, payment of the benefit is often in kind. Moreover, the benefit is not indexed to account
for inflation, and the minimum amount is far too low-set  at the minimum wage, which is currently 83
rubles (or less than $5).  Second, the current system is inconsistent  as it mixes the principle of insurance
with the principle of poverty alleviation. By extending the benefit to first-time job seekers, re-entrants to
the  labor market, and  some other workers  with no  or no  immediate previous  history of  insurance
contributions (although at a very low level, currently less than  10 percent of the average wage), the
system works as a quasi social assistance program.  Exhausters of the benefit are also eligible for the
minimum benefit after a waiting period of six months. Last but not least, the current system allows for
huge interregional differentials, as 80% of Employment Fund revenues are retained in the regions As a
result  some regions do  not have  resources to  pay  benefits, while others  have resources  for capital
construction.
3.12  Under the current circumstances, the function of the unemployment benefit system should be
strengthened  and the  system  itself  significantly  simplified  bythe  introduction  of aflat-rate  benefit.  This
benefit would be available only to those workers with immediate previous work history while paying
contributions to  the employment fund.  While  in the  immediate future  its  level would have  to  be
determined by the availability of resources, in the longer terrn the government must strive to raise it
above the subsistence level. Employment Fund should be centralized to allow for redistribution to poorer
regions.
3.13  Severance pay requires special attention by the govemment. The current legal provisions are
often not fulfilled since enterprises do not have the liquidity to finance due severance. However, from the
point  of  view  of  the  reformist  govemment,  offering  an  administratively  simple  and  adequate
compensation package may be the right way to facilitate genuine enterprise restructuring, that is, to make
a once-and-for-all  expenditure with potentially very high returns. At the same time, there is no doubt that
typically the scale of compensation payments required for a large enterprise restructuring and divestiture
program lies beyond what can be afforded from regional budgets. Therefore, there is a strong case for the
federal government  to step in and offer attractive packages to reformist regional governors.
3.14  Labor market interventions.  In Russia's circumstances it is very difficult to use labor market
interventions to promote  enterprise restructuring and job  creation.  Some measures  that  are viewed
favorably in developed economies-for  example, wage and hiring subsidies, particularly for low-skill
workers-may  provoke manipulation and strategic behavior on the part of enterprises and are thus deemed
inappropriate. The presence of soft budget constraints impedes efficient reallocation of labor also  by
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from  undergoing bankruptcy-may  bid  away  workers who  would  otherwise  accept jobs  in  more
prosperous enterprises.  That is, even if programs do succeed in putting workers to jobs, it is not clear,
given the prevalence of labor hoarding, that the new jobs would constitute a true job creation and increase
efficiency of labor allocation (the same problem existed also under the  socialist system). It is also highly
unlikely that the effectiveness of labor allocation would be promoted through programs to stimulate labor
shedding by financing the separation costs of enterprises.  Under the current incentives, there is even no
guarantee that after separation the workers are not rehired by the same enterprise.
3.15  Programs that are worth supporting under present circumstances are those that create jobs in a
more direct and controllable manner, such as public works.  Because they can combine the provision of
work opportunity to the poor with key basic maintenance and rehabilitation investments, public works
programs suit best the purpose of the project currently under consideration. However, they should also be
selected on the basis of high rate of return.
FIGHTING SOCIAL  EXCLUSION
3.16  One of the burning issues the government needs to address in the more general framework of
social policy development is how to improve the efficiency, coverage and impact of programs to address
the needs of those specific groups of the population most vulnerable to social exclusion and to confront
major problems related to their integration in society. In particular, the country has to review, restructure
or design social programs dealing with orphaned children (especially those who are in  institutions),
children from dysfunctional families, street children, children with special needs, single (isolated) elderly
unable to take care of themselves, and the homeless. These groups have different needs and the hardship
of transition affects them differently, so they require different type of services and other assistance.
Nevertheless, they have one thing in common: isolation  from  the society and exclusion  from most of the
existing social programs or safety nets. Both public social services and non-governmental  assistance can
play important roles in design and provision of various types of assistance to these groups.
3.17  Many of the problems related to social exclusion can only be resolved with an improvement of
the overall economic situation. Meanwhile, increased attention should be given to the current situation in
trying to reduce the risk of more children being abandoned or ending up in the street, to prevent further
disintegration of society with the growth of crime originating from these social phenomena, and to
improve the existing programs dealing with socially dislocated groups. In this area, communities and
local social workers should play the most important role and their efforts should be supported, leading to
decentralization of social services and increase of the community role in outreach to the most needy.
Among socially excluded groups the situation with children is of particular concern.
3.18  Street children. The government  has made support to street children (estimates vary between one
and four million children occasionally or permanently living in the streets) a key focus of the social
component of its new program. The phenomenon of street children is directly related to the social stress
experienced by Russian society during the transition and it is expected that the situation will worsen with
the additional fall in living standards due to the financial crisis.  Many factors can explain this growing
phenomenon: increase in rates of divorce, alcoholism, households falling into deep poverty, inflow of
refugees from CIS countries and southern regions of Russia, sometimes the poor state of some boarding
institutions for orphans or abused children.
3.19  Street children are difficult to  integrate in formal programs. Recent studies suggest that they
come often from other CIS countries, are concentrated in big cities, and are usually asked by  their
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being exploited by adults. Experience in other countries shows that abuse of such children is often related
to exploitation  for prostitution and theft. To cope with this harsh reality, children may end up using drugs,
and selling them to be able to sustain the habit.
3.20  It is a very complex problem and programs should be developed towards very open forms of
temporary support provided to street children who participate voluntarily, for example, shelters where
children can come and go, and canteens serving hot meals for street children. As they are also liable to
have severe attachment disorders and post-traumatic disorders, psychological and emotional support may
be equally important.
3.21  Children in institutions.  Permanent residential institutions should be the exception and last resort
for dealing with the problem of orphaned, neglected or abused children.  It is difficult to reintegrate in
society a child who comes out of a residential institution. Often, children who spend a long time in an
institution lack the basic emotional care and security needed, resulting in developmental delays. On social
and humanitarian grounds, therefore, institutional care should be considered only as a last resort. It is also
very expensive. Incentives should therefore be given to communities (i) to reintegrate these children in
society through alternative family care (adoption, foster parental care or through special programs to
support relatives or biological parents of the children), as well as (ii) to  carry out preventative work
addressing the root of the problems-dysfunctional  families and families in crisis-and  aiming to reduce
the number of abandoned, orphaned and neglected children.
3.22  Dealing with these issues will require reorientation of the current system into support for families
rather than a "saving the children by the state" approach, and building a coherent strategy for child care,
covering adequate medical and psychological treatment of children according to their needs, support to
poor and dysfunctional families, family and child/teenager counseling, finding families for children and
development of alternative family care models.
3.23  Children with special needs. The Russian society needs a major transformation to accept such
children (and adults), to allow them to integrate fuilly  and to have enriched lives. Such work requires a
complex approach covering development of a coherent policy, major investments in infrastructure and
equipment, serious changes in  mentality  and  attitude,  large-scale education and  information work,
changes of health care and education systems leading to individualization  of their approach to children,
and  development of corrective  individual training  plans.  This cannot  be  done quickly.  There  are,
however, at  least three  main lines  along which  initial  efforts should be oriented: (i)  mainstreaming
children with special needs into local schools and  improving their access to the  social infrastructure
available for ordinary people, (ii)  increasing public awareness of their needs and ways to treat them with
respect, understanding and kindness; (iii) educating and training parents in  keeping children with special
needs within a family context and giving the child the warmth and security he needs to develop a normal
life. This approach will help to integrate such children in the society.
3.24  Early child nutrition and infants in orphanages. The danger of child malnutrition in the poorest
multi-children families will inevitably increase under the post-crisis conditions, underlining the crucial
need to target assistance to such families. There is no indication at this stage that operation of the milk
kitchens, where mothers get free or heavily subsidized milk and diary products for children under two,
has yet been significantly affected-neither  the Ministry of Health nor the Association of Milk Kitchens
are aware of any crisis impact. The kitchens still  function all  over the  country and  provide limited
amounts of products, although they have received no funds from the federal budget since 1996 and their
significance for  many mothers seems  to  be  diminishing. The  growing number of  infants  in baby
orphanages, who are the responsibility of the public budget and cannot be breastfed, are a particular
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future: (i) the share of children under one year old in the baby orphanages (with infants up to the age of
three) has increased dramatically in the  last few years,  from about  15-20% to  40-50%; and  (ii) the
resulting increase in their requirements for baby food, combined with the rise in import prices, will be
difficult to support under the tightening budget constraints of the orphanages. These are priority areas for
careful monitoring. Support to Russian baby food producers or to imports would not provide a solution
for the poorest families or for baby orphanages. What is called for is early action to support the incomes
of the neediest mothers, through effective targeting of assistance, minimizing the number of infants for
whom the state needs to take responsibility.
3.25  Isolated elderly and disabled. The single elderly are found among the groups most vulnerable to
poverty. Capacity to take care of their everyday needs is decreasing with age and aggravating diseases
and, being alone, they fully depend on formal safety nets.  In most cases, their survival challenge is not
the shortage of income per se, but limited ability to move and to receive external support resulting in lack
of access to medical, social and other services, difficulties in obtaining food or pharmaceuticals, entire
marginalization from the society. The evidence suggests that none of the existing programs initiated by
either  social  offices or  non-governmental organizations reach  these  isolated people adequately  and
provide services according to their need. The public programs include local day-care centers for the
single elderly and disabled, organized by  social workers, and  specific services provided sporadically
(cleaning, food and drug purchase, settling obligatory payments, etc.) by free-lance social workers. Such
programs should be supported and expanded, with specific attention given to lessons of experience such
as success and failure in reaching socially isolated elderly and disabled. One of the challenging issues to
resolve is how to identify these people and help them to reintegrate into the society. Club work, day care,
information dissemination, specific actions undertaken in large and fairly disintegrated communities (bit
cities) should be designed in order to help identify socially excluded people, their needs and ways to
bring them back to a decent existence.
3.26  Programs should be designed in a way that would strengthen social capital and help Russia to
strengthen civil society. This would entail giving additional responsibilities to local level organizations
and communities to take on the delivery of social programs,  increasing the participation of communities
and beneficiaries in decision making and monitoring of social programs, and providing incentives to
families and local groups to take responsibility for helping socially vulnerable groups.
GIVING  A STRONGER ROLE TO NON-GOVERNMENTAL  ORGANIZATIONS  (NGOs)
3.27  Close collaboration with NGOs in designing the response to the social impact of the financial
crisis and in fighting social exclusion should be high on the government's priority list.  NGOs are still
relatively new in Russia and very few are active in the social assistance area at the federation level.  The
Red  Cross is probably one  exception and  it  is mostly  active  in delivering humanitarian assistance
programs. At the local level, however, some NGOs are quite active in the delivery of programs or as
lobbies to ensure that support is provided to their constituents. Examples of powerful NGOs are the
association of war veterans or the association of mothers of soldiers. The Russian Orthodox Church,
which has a fast growing network of parishes, still has a relatively small role in delivering programs to
the poor, aside from limited charitable activities connected to the church parishes. Although the church
has limited experience in this field, it is a potentially important stakeholder in the medium to long term.
3.28  Capacity building of local NGOs to support delivery of social programs to the vulnerable groups
as well as in supporting the self employed and small enterprises is essential to support decentralization of
social  services and increasing outreach. Some local NGOs  are  increasingly  involved in  delivering
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capacity and sometimes face a hostile attitude from local governments. There is evidence also that many
new NGOs are being created with the purpose of accessing donor funds despite weak program proposals
and no experience Careful screening of NGOs is therefore needed before they can be funded. A number
of international  NGOs have developed very interesting programs to strengthen capacity of NGOs, such as
the Eurasia Foundation and Open Society Institute which provide technical support and sub-grants on a
competitive basis to local NGOs. Through these initiatives, networks of NGOs have been created such as
the Siberian Civic Initiative, particularly active in Vladivostok, and networks in Novgorod and Moscow.
NEW DELIVERY  MECHANISMS  FOR COMMUNITY  BASED  SOCIAL  PROGRAMS
3.29  Existing mechanisms for delivery of social services and social support to the poor in the Russian
federation have a number of limitations.  They lack the capacity to target the most needy: with very few
exceptions, the regions do not have reliable mechanisms to  ensure that cash benefit or humanitarian
assistance is delivered to the most needy among the population.  Also, no mechanisms exist to weight
fiscal transfers from the Federation according to poverty levels or social needs criteria. This is a major
shortcoming that seriously limits the efficiency of public expenditures in the social sphere. The federation
also lacks mechanisms to act rapidly, efficiently, and in accountable way, to  support areas at the sub
regional level that are experiencing  temporary serious social problems.
3.30  With a few exceptions, collaboration between the various agencies that are active at the local
level is poor. Lack of information to beneficiaries and of participation of different stakeholders in design
and monitoring of programs, often results in lack of accountability and poor perforrnance.  It is very
important to, encourage a  broader participation of  citizens  and  institutions which  are  close  to  the
population in the design and implementation of social support programs.
3.31  It seems therefore important to support the design of mechanisms that would have the following
characteristics: (i) favor a clear sharing of responsibility between the federation, the regions and the local
level structures (raion, municipalities,  NGOs); (ii) encourage the participation of the population and local
level institutions in the delivery of services; (iii) integrate specific instruments to ensure adequate control
and accountability in the use of funds, and to channel funds rapidly to finance visible activities that help
the poor and vulnerable groups.  A socialfund  type mechanism which has been implemented successfully
in some former Soviet republics, could help in achieving the above mentioned goals (see Annex 2 for a
detailed proposal.
3.32  The social fund should have the following specific design features. It should receive proposals
prepared by local governments, NGOs and local associations. Its staff  would evaluate these proposals
according to pre-defined criteria clearly stated in an operational manual. Approval of individual appraised
proposals would be  made by  committees set-up at  the  local level with representatives of  different
stakeholders. The social fund would integrate a Management Information System designed to track all
expenditures and physical progress of  individual projects.  Its activities would be overseen by a Board
set up at the central level. Some of these mechanisms have already been tested recently in the framework
of the coal restructuring projects and have worked well in the support of social programs.
3.33  The social fund-type mechanism finance may also finance labor intensive public works that are
identified by municipalities, local associations, NGOs or local administrations, for the rehabilitation of
local infrastructure, including sanitation  systems, schools rehabilitation, road  maintenance, etc.  The
social-fund mechanism could also be used as a tool to address some of the problems of socially excluded
groups, including support programs for street children, pensioners living alone  and the handicapped
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priority activities.
IMPROVED TARGETING
3.34  With sharply tighter budget constraints and an increased number of people in need, the financial
crisis has made targeting even more important than before. The country faces a  challenge with cost
recovery in many major sectors, including housing, energy, communications and utilities. Two kinds of
transfers are involved: general cross-subsidies which are given to all (for example, the price of the metro
in Moscow is low for everyone); and numerous special benefits (I'goty) which are given to privileged
groups such as the elderly, veterans, people who work in certain occupations, etc. While indeed some of
these groups may be poor, there is clear evidence that the vast majority are not.
3.35  One of the real challenges of determining who is poor in Russia is the fact that money income is
not a good indicator of household welfare or poverty. First, many households are paid in kind instead  of
cash; and  in either  case the payments are  erratic. Second, much of household real  consumption is
obtained from the labor and assets of the household itself, or of other households.  The most important
example is that of the private plot, whereby many households obtain a good portion, the majority, or
nearly all of their food consumption. Third, households benefit from gifts of food or goods from other
related or non-related households; these  gifts are often consumed immediately. Such inter-household
transfers can play  an  important role  in keeping  some kinds  of  households, such as  single parent
households, either out of poverty, or in less severe poverty. Fourth, households also tend to  under-report
(hide or conceal) their true income, to both social workers and to survey interviewers, in all countries.
Means-testing (determined household income and wealth)  is quite expensive even  in countries with
advanced tax reporting systems, but is prohibitively expensive in a country like Russia where individuals
do  not perceive the  need to  fully  disclose their  informal earnings and  where they  may indeed be
frightened to do so, for fear of loss of privileges, rent-seeking on the part of official contacts, or violence
on the  part of "business associates." Finally, while  household consumption  is less prone to under-
reporting than income and is a much better guide to household welfare, it takes considerable time and
effort to collect detailed information on household consumption  from household surveys. Trying to do so
as an eligibility criteria for receiving social assistance would be even more costly than income- or means-
testing.  (Plus households would quickly learn to under-state their expenditures just  as some currently
under-state their incomes).
3.36  Several alternatives to fully documenting every household's income and expenditure that are also
better than the previous outdated categorical approach, have been introduced experimentally in three
social assistance pilots in the Komi Republic, and in Volgograd and Voronezh oblasts. Each of the three
pilot methodologies tries to estimate the additional amount of consumption that a hypothetical household
could achieve, and to use this estimated household consumption  to determine eligibility (Box 7).
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The three social assistance pilots were designed to identify the poorest of the poor, and to transfer a modest cash benefit to
them. Identification of the poorest was based on estimating the potential consumption of families  based on their measurable
characteristics.  Households were awarded benefits if their estimated per capita consumption was below 35 percent of the per
capita subsistence minimum in Komi, and below 50 percent in Voronezh and Volgograd. Three different approaches were
used. In Komi, households were said to be judged based on "economic potential" of the family. The methodology imputed
the worth of a private plot, rental of "above-norm" space, and use of a private automobile--the latter two, to  estimate
informal income, the first to estimate income in kind. The approach in Voronezh was a refinement of the traditional
categorical approach to determining "need,"  with the benefit made available only to certain kinds of people thought a priori
to be poor (many-child households, single mothers, single pensioners, disabled). An addition to the traditional categories
was made  by the inclusion of families with children who  could show wage arrears of  more than 3  months and the
unemployed.  Also,  actual (not assigned) money income was calculated along with income from land and livestock. The
approach in Volgograd was two-fold, as the oblast was asked to pilot the approach most foreign to Russia--a proxy means
test 4--in three raions.  The rest of  the oblast was left to its traditional categorical-only approach.. Preliminary results
suggested that this approach is similar to Voronezh in that both provide better targeting outcomes than the outmoded
traditional  categorical approach.
3.37  Several  lessons  can be drawn  from the  successful  implementation  of the three  different  targeting
systems in three  very different  oblasts of Russia:
*  Targeting  is feasible.  All the  methodologies  relied  on  some  estimate  of  "economic  potential"
"total  potential  income"  or  "potential  consumption"  of  the  applicants  to  avoid  reliance  on
statutory  (naschislenniy)  income  (which would  lead to highly distortionary  outcomes  in a country
where  wages  and  transfers  are  often  not  paid  on time  and  where  individuals  may  under-report
income  because of tax considerations).
*  Targeting  can  be  effective.  Oblasts  which  have  introduced  targeting  report  a  higher  degree  of
social  consensus  and  a  much  increased  ability  for  the  authorities  to  help  those  who  are  truly
needy.
*  Benefits  should  be paid  in cash  wherever  possible.  Countless  respondents  and  social  workers
have  informed  the  mission  during  its many  visits  that  the  provision  of  a timely  benefit  in cash
was crucial  for families  to resolve  problems  such  as  immediate  need for food, for transportation
to  search  work,  or  for  the  purchase  of  medication  or  school  supplies.  No  system  could  have
identified  all these individual needs and met them successfully  through  any  sort of mechanism  for
distribution  of in-kind items.
*  Computerization  and  training  promote  the  effectiveness  of social  workers.  Automation  allowed
the social worker  more time with the client. Also,  the special trainings  that were  conducted  by the
oblast  authorities  on  the  goal  of  means-testing,  led  to  a  greater  degree  of  satisfaction  and
effectiveness  on the part of the social workers.
*  Transparency is extremely important. In the three areas, the pilot program was widely publicized
in  the  press,  on  radio  and  also  on  posters  displayed  at  local  social  assistance  offices.
4  A proxy means test is a formula calculated from regression coefficients, when actual consumption is regressed on correlates of
consumption  (or its opposite, poverty). The formula can be then used to predict consumption of households from the regressor
variables,  such as wage income received,  number of members of the household, presence of a car, etc.
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on only those extreme and unusual cases that did not fit the profile. In such cases, or in the event
of client dissatisfaction,  the case was referred to a "conciliation commission." If the commission
found that the circumstances were indeed meritorious, then the oblasts used other kinds of help
for the client (often the "one-time assistance.").  This meant that over all, there was a feeling of
social fairness associated with the pilot benefits.
*  Errors  of  exclusion  can  be  minimized.  The  mechanism  of  the  conciliation  commission
demonstrated that  it  is  possible  to  minimize  errors  of  exclusion  in  any  methodology.
Unfortunately, many  people  when  they  first  think  of  social  assistance think  of  keeping
undeserving  people out (avoiding the inclusion of the non-poor). While it is usually possible to
construct an expensive system of supervision that minimizes errors of inclusion, such systems do
not perform well in what should be the primary goal of any social assistance program--reaching
the poor or reaching the poorest of the poor.  The pilots were designed to reach the poorest of the
poor (given the fiscal constraints of both the federal and local governments) and preliminary
evidence suggests that this goal was achieved.  In particular, the conciliation committee was an
"escape hatch" for those few cases that were deemed needy by the oblast but did not meet the
selection criteria of the methodology.
*  Targeting should not be confined to experimental benefits. Targeting can be used extremely
effectively towards targeting any  benefit, whether  in  cash  or  in kind. The  introduction of
targeting eliminates the  old  categorical approach which  excludes the  new  poor,  especially
families with children and the unemployed.  Before the introduction of the pilot benefit in the
three oblasts, local authorities were limited to helping such families only by the so-called "one-
time assistance"  which was often not enough to bring the families out of poverty. By eliminating
allocation of benefits to the old privileged categories, resources could be freed to target the
poorest of the poor.
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3.38  Monitoring of targeting and social assistance is an important aspect of overall effectiveness. The
social assistance pilots included several different kinds of monitoring:
*  monitoring of the quality of work of  social workers
*  monitoring of finances from central and local sources
*  mid-term course correction for methodologies
*  monitoring of administrative  costs
*  planned monitoring of beneficiaries and those who did not receive benefits
monitoring of actual pilot outcomes (survey)
*  monitoring of particularly vulnerable groups, such as children in danger of being malnourished or
institutionalized.
3.39  Ideally, one management information system (MIS) would be set up within the Ministry of Labor
and Social Development (MLSD) to perform these monitoring functions. As it is currently, the MLSD is
often not informed by the regions of developments in a timely fashion.
FoOD, FUEL AND  PHARMACEUTICALS  EMERGENCY  ASSISTANCE
3.40  Food. Large scale food aid is not likely to  be an appropriate instrument for addressing the
particular needs of vulnerable groups and regions.  Past experience with food aid in Russia (1991-93)
indicates that targeting is approximate at best, and dangers of diversion and corruption are high. Food aid
sold on open markets depresses incentives for domestic producers, and does little to help genuinely needy
consumers.  Government management of counterpart funds, even when they flow as intended to the
budget, may not be adequate to direct these resources to the intended targeted interventions in the social
sphere.  Agricultural interests within Russia may exert pressures to use counterpart funds instead for
centralized investments in favored activities of questionable long-term viability. The proceeds from
already granted aid  from USAID (US$ 600 billion)  and  the  expected aid from the EU  should be
distributed to the population using targeting mechanisms such as the ones described above.
3.41  Fuel. The fuel situation in the North is more serious than the food situation. The preliminary
assessment of the overall situation was that the European North (Murmansk, Archangelsk, Komi, and
Nenets) would be in better position should emergency measures need to be taken because of the easier
transport access to those regions. Finland and Norway have been offering aid in the form of food and fuel
to its neighbors on the Kola Peninsula.  Alaska had delivered 20,000 tons to its neighboring Arctic littoral,
Chukotka.
3.42  Pharmaceuticals. Additional needs are related not to a shortage of pharmaceuticals, but to the
problem of a steep increase in pharmaceuticals' prices as a result of exchange rate movements, when 60%
of drugs are imported and most of the others are made of foreign components. The needs are estimated at
$60 to 100  million.
23BANK'S  ASSISTANCE
Box 8: Current Lending Activities Of The Bank In Social Sectors
The World Bank has an extensive program of assistance to Russia's social sectors. It addresses many of the gaps or emerging
problems that are being exacerbated by the crisis, as well  as longer term structural reforms in social protection and social
services.
Projects under implementation or preparation:
*  Social Protection Adjustment Loan (SPAL) - the SPAL, together with a related technical assistance loan - the Social
Protection Implementation  Loan (SPIL), described below, form the operational  framework for Bank advice and lending in social
protection. The SPAL supports strategies aimed at providing Russia with a social safety net that provides protection to the poor
and vulnerable groups for the transition and beyond.  It focuses on the pension system (minimum pensions, short-term stability
of the Pension Fund,  and systemic pension reform), employment and labor market policy (unemployment benefits, active
programs, labor  code),  child allowances (transition  from  a  universal to  a targeted  benefit,  institutional strengthening),
rationalization of short term benefits (sick pay, matemity benefits) and social assistance (better targeting). The first and second
tranche conditions of the adjustment loan have been met. Following a govemment request to redesign the third tranche of the
SPAL, changes were introduced to the program. The changes maintain the directions of reform of the social protection system
that formed the basis for the SPAL, while introduce a program of actions that will strengthen the reforms and take into account
the constraints imposed by the current economic and financial circumstances.
*  Social Protection Implementation  Loan (SPIL) - this technical assistance/investment  companion of the SPAL, is aimed
at supporting the design and implementation of policies introduced under the SPAL, as well as flexibly addressing design and
implementation of related issues in social protection.  A number of ongoing activities under this project directly address the
fallout from the crisis:  (1) monitoring of vulnerable groups and the impact of social programs aimed at such groups; (2)
examining  the scope for rationalization of poverty benefits; and (3) review  of programs for the long term unemployed.
*  Employment Services and Social Protection Project - this project is piloting ways to strengthen delivery of active
employment programs (counseling, assessment, provision of occupational  information), and it is providing equipment to speed
up the delivery of pension payments (it has reduced waiting times from an average of two weeks to two days).  Recently, the
government has requested that the project should pilot community development  programs to stimulate employment, and such a
component is in the process of being introduced into the project. Such pilots  would subsequently be expanded
*  Pension Support Project (1999) - a new investment project under preparation and with strong ownership on the
Russian side, aims at improving efficiency of the pension administration  and at the introduction of individual worker accounts.
It would also begin to address the institutional changes that will be necessary  for the introduction of the government's reform of
the public pension system.
*  Northern  Migration Pilot Project At the request of the Russian government, a project is under preparation to develop
incentive-based public migration assistance schemes that will encourage  voluntary  migration from settlements in the Russian Far
North.  It is expected that the schemes subsequently would be adopted more generally to promote migration in support of the
government's Northern restructuring policy, which aims at making Northem development self-sustaining, reducing the need for
public subsidies and northern-specific transfers from the federal budget.
*  Medical Equipment Project - This project is supplying badly needed medical equipment to primary and secondary
level facilities.  The government may request the Bank to allocate some of the funds under the project for emergency drug
purchases.
*  Health Reform Pilot Project - Approaches to longer-term restructuring  at the oblast level are being tried out in this
project.  Implementation has just started and should continue as planned. Early findings are being used to design national level
reforms under the proposed Health Reform Implementation Project.
*  Health Reform  Implementation Project  - This project (under preparation for  FYOO) will  address longer-term
restructuring issues from the national perspective and build Ministry of Health's  capacity  to lead the reforms in partnership with
regions.
*  Education Innovation Project (1997) - this project aims at improving the quality and provision of  textbooks to
secondary schools.  It does so through support for developing new curricula  and improving the approval mechanism for new
textbooks. In higher education, it is establishing  a fund to promote innovative  approaches to development of social sciences and
governance reform.
*  Education Restructuring Project (1999) - will address structural problems as well as regional autonomy issues. It
addresses longer-term issues of education finance, and it also aims at reform in testing and assessment, curriculum development
and teacher training, school administration. It will test solutions to these issues by means of pilots in selected regions.
243.43  Box 8 describes the Bank's  existing assistance in the social sectors. As a result of the crisis, a
new operation, the Local Social Protection Delivery is being discussed with the  government.  The
proposed project would aim at mitigating the social impact of the financial crisis.
3.44  The operation would consist of two components. The first component would focus on targeting.
It  would help to expand the pilot experiment started under the SPAL in three regions and allow the
government and regions to improve targeting of cash benefit programs and humanitarian assistance. The
component would also support continuing improvement  of the monitoring system to help identification of
regions and areas in special need of support. There are conceptually two stages to this effort-rapid
response and longer-term development.  The rapid response would focus on  selected oblasts where
locally financed social assistance is already provided through some sort of targeting mechanism. A team
of Russian and World Bank experts would assess the existing methodologies and recommend changes in
order to implement a strong system of monitoring of targeting on the local level, with central and local
reporting. The rapid response would quickly help capable oblasts to target more efficiently, and serve as
a demonstration for the rest of the country which would be covered in a longer-term investment project.
Longer-term  development  would gradually expand  the targeting program nationwide.
3.45  The second component would help to set up a new delivery mechanism for social assistance and
social services in the form of a Community Solidarity Fund. This Fund would finance programs targeted
at the poor and vulnerable groups and implemented by institutions active at the community level (raion
and village  councils, small  town  municipalities, local associations). The Fund would support  three
programs:
*  (i)  labor intensive public works  to  support rehabilitation of basic infrastructure useful  for local
communities and create temporary employment for long term unemployed and workers who are not
paid any wages;
*  (ii) support, on a competitive basis, of local institutions to provide care to street children and isolated
elderly and help in their integration in society;
*  (iii) pilot community improvement programs that would help poor and isolated villages and small
town to undertake small projects to improve delivery of social services to community members. The
details are described in Annex 3.
3.46  Labor market review.  In order to provide the Bank and the government with a solid basis for
realistic  policy-related advice  and  project  work  in  the  labor  and  employment  area,  in  the  crisis
circumstances, the Bank needs  to undertake a review that will assess  current labor market policies,
investigate the nature of Russian labor markets, and evaluate current activities in the employment area.
This will result in a World Bank sector review.  (Similar ones have been done in poverty and for social
protection.)  The work would be undertaken through a series of missions and  in  collaboration with
Russian authorities and individual experts.  It would draw on disparate studies and surveys  - Russian and
other - that are ongoing.  We expect to complete it in mid-1999.  We shall be seeking the support and
advice of the Ministry of Labor and Social Development in this activity.
3.47  At the same time the existing operations would have to be modified or restructured to take into
account new post-crisis realities.
3.48  Social  Protection  Adjustment  Loan  (SPAL).  The  constraints  imposed  by  the  current  crisis
made it unlikely that third tranche conditions could be fully met without waivers on some conditions and
significant delays in the  fulfillment of others.  In this  situation, the  SPAL third  tranche  has been
25restructured with a view to introducing conditionalities  that take into account new crisis developments,
and that are implementable under the current situation, as well as monitorable. Some of the new SPAL
conditionalities have, inter alia, to be directly linked to the issues of targeting and delivery mechanisms
that are to be covered by the Local Social  Protection  Delivery Project
3.49  Social Protection  Implementation Loan  (SPIL). The  SPIL is expected to  continue  as  its
activities in fact extend beyond the confines of the SPAL.  It also offers the opportunity of flexible
adaptation to emerging needs, as long as they stay within the original framework of the SPIL objectives.
Currently, SPIL also has ongoing activities that address the fallout of the crisis, such as developing
programs for thfe  long term unemployed, and developing  poverty and standards of living monitoring and
survey capacity.  All respond to the crisis and are well under implementation.  Accelerating those actions,
and making sure that implementation  occurs  successfully,  should be the priority.
3.50  Structural Adjustment Loan  (SAL 3).  The social protection agenda pursued in the context of
the SPAL and the SPIL is being supported and further developed under  SAL 3.  That loan, which is
currently being discussed with the Government,  is expected to include conditionalities related to strategic
issues on employment and social insurance,  as well as federal-fiscal relations. In employment, changes in
the labor code will make it more market-oriented,  with better income and employment opportunities for
workers and more efficient functioning of commercial enterprises.  In social insurance, conditionality
aims at focusing social insurance on essential services (sick pay, maternity benefits), and on removing
distortions in the current system for provision  of sick pay.  This is expected to improve efficiency in the
use of resources in this area, and allow reduction  in the payroll tax for social insurance.  Moreover, that
SAL is expected to improve transparency in federal-regional fiscal relations, which will allow for better
management of resources going to the regions  and at regional levels, including for poverty alleviation.
3.51 Child welfare (institutionalized children).  The Bank has  recently undertaken a review of the
institutionalization of children with the support of the Ministries of Labor and Social Development,
Education and Health. A report is under preparation. Based on the report's findings and forthcoming
discussions with the Russian government,  we expect to reach an agreement on strategic measures in the
area of child care reform, addressing, in particular, options for deinstitutionalization and restructuring of
child care, development of alternative family systems, support for  families in crisis, development of
alternative small-scale forms  of institutionalized care  for  unavoidable cases,  provision of  diverse
effective social services to children at risk in the situation of tight budget constraints, mainstreaming of
children in institutions. We expect that this will lead to a future project or project component.
3.52 Pharmaceuticals. While it would be possible to provide temporary financial support to publicly-
owned health facilities to mitigate the shock  of price increases, such assistance would do little to solve
the  long-term structural problems related to  improper selection and use of drugs, inefficient market
distribution mechanisms, and inappropriate  pricing policies which, besides the lack of money, are the
fundamental causes of drugs shortages. In addition, such assistance could cover only inpatient drugs,
which are given free-of-charge in hospital  facilities. Because outpatient drugs are purchased directly by
patients through retail pharmacies, targeting  emergency assistance for outpatient drugs would be difficult
at best.  Preferential support for inpatient drugs would, in turn, exacerbate the distortionary incentives
already present in the health system  to overuse inpatient services, and unnecessarily increase the costs of
the health system.  The long-term structural reform of the health system planned under the proposed
Health Reform Implementation Project would  be the more appropriate response to funding shortages in
health and eventually to reducing drug shortages.
3.53  Severance pay. While there is a strong case to finance severance pay for enterprise reform
programs supported by reformist regional governors,  the federal government is unlikely to have resources
26to finance those programs. Therefore, there  is a  case for the World Bank to consider the provision of
resources for severance pay, at a given point in time, to remove a financial constraint to government and
enterprise reformn.  This could be done in the context of resumed adjustment lending, with counterpart
funds generated by Bank loan proceeds used for financing severance pay. This has already happened in
the case of the coal industry restructuring. On a case by  case basis, this could also be done through
investment lending where severance pay may be financed directly as a component of an operation to
restructure a sector, such as the education sector, or steel works, or railways.
3.54  Of course, an important concern for the Bank should be making  sure that workers who have
received severance packages are not rehired by the same enterprise. The solution to rehiring needs to lie
in paying careful attention in the design of projects to the reinstatement of payroll controls, and the
overall hardening of fiscal discipline. In the context of adjustment operations this means that (i) severance
pay financing should not be considered before a fully-fledged reform program, supported by the IMF, is
put in place,  and (ii)  severance pay financing  should be available only where  Bank staff makes a
judgment  that  a  robust and  comprehensive sectoral  or regional  reform  program is  in  place,  with
monitorable targets and genuine  political commitment for its implementation. In practice, such a program,
developed with the federal government, should make additional financing available to those regional
governors who are genuinely interested in enterprise reform and who  prove that they stop soft-budget
constraint for enterprises.
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Annex 1 - Table 1: Russia: Basic Indicators 1991-97
1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999 (est)
Consumer Prices
(Annual average % change)  92.7  1734.6  874.7  307.4  197.4  47.6  14.6  27.8  60.0
GDP
(Constant Prices % Change)  -5.0  -14.5  -8.7  -12.6  -4.1  -3.5  0.8  -4.6  -8.3
General Government Balance
(% of GDP)  -31.0  -21.6  -7.4  -10.4  -5.7  -8.2  -7.5
Trade Balance
(Billion US$)  9.5  21.1  17.4  17.0  16.6  14.4
Barter Transactions in Russia
Industry (% of Sales)  6  11  18  26  40  47  54
(Aug)
Open Unemployment Rate
(% of Labor Force)
- Registered  0.1  0.8  1.1  2.1  3.2  3.5  3.2  2.7
- surveybased  0.0  4.8  5.7  6.9  7.8  9.0  10.8  11.5
Source:  Goskomstat  Rossii,  1997,  Sotsialnoye  Polozheniye  i uroven  'zhizni  naseleniya  Rossii.  Moscow:
Goskomstat. p. 38, World Bank. EBRD.
Annex I - Table 2: Wage  Arrears  In Russia's  Economy
l____________  l1995  1996  1997  1998  1998  1999
As of January, I  As of January, I  As of November, I  As of August, I  As of October, I  As of February 1
Wage Arrears  - 4.2 trillion rub.  20.8 trillion rub.  55.3 trillion rub.  75,8 billion rub.  88.09  billion rub.  76.04 billion rub
total  (denominated)  (denominated)  (denominated)
Number  of  30.9 thousand  39.9 thousand  No data  114 thousand  138 thousand  118 thousand
enterprises  with
wage arrears
Annex I -Table  3:  Russia: Poverty Headcounts, 1994-96
World Bank  Estimate  R.LMS7UNC  lin  Official Goskomstat Rossii  ISEPN Correction
of Official
(In percent of population/individuals  5)
1994  37.6  17.1  22.4  42.0
1995  39.6  30.7  24.7  ...
1996  43.1  36.9  22.0  34.5
(In percent of households 6)
1994  32.2  15.3  ...  ...
1995  33.7  28.9  ...  ...
1996  37.1  34.7  ...
Source: Goskomstat Rossii 1997, p. 116; Author calculations  from World Bank version of RLMS; and ISEPN  Rossiya-1997
Sotsial'no-demograficheskaya  situatsiya,  1998,  p.1 92-93.
Note
I  Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (panel households only All-Russia Subsistence Minimum). Author calculations
2  UNC (University of North Carolina) poverty line for 8 regions. RLMS panel households only.
3  From official bulletins and statistical  yearbook (Goskomstat Rossii 1997).
4  According to ISEPN, the new poverty methodology adopted by Goskomstat Rossii in 1994 meant that the actual headcount
was 42 percent but the published headcount was only 22.4 percent
5 Grossed up to individuals by weighting by household size in each year.
6 Goskomstat Rossii does not routinely publish data from the family budget survey on the householdifamily  level.
28Annex  1 - Table 4:  Russia: Poverty Measures 1994-96  & Short Term Scenarios, 1998-99
(In percent)
P0  Poverty Gap  Gap as % of GDP
(Headcount)  (Billion Rubles)
(In percent of population/individuals 2/)
1994  37.6  24.6  4.0
1995  39.6  27.7  1.7
1996  43.1  31.1  1.4
(Poverty Scenarios)
1998-99
Flat 12  Decline  49.1  36.4  2.0
Poor Lose  46.9  37.9  2.3
Rich Lose  50.5  35.2  1.6
Memorandum Items  (in billion rubles)
GDP in 1994  610.7
GDP in 1995  1630.1
GDP in 1996  2256.1
Source: Author calculations from World Bank version of RLMS data base
i/  Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (panel households only)
Author  calculations.
2/ Grossed up to individuals  by weighting by household size in each round.
Note: Poverty gap is the total sum of money which would be required to move all individuals out of poverty if
targeting is assumed to be perfect. It is the difference between actual consumption and the poverty line (the
subsistence minimum)  for each individual multiplied by total individuals. The poverty gap as a percent of GDP is this
number divided by GDP and multiplied by 100 percent.
Annex I - Table 5:  Russia: Extreme Poverty Composition  And Household  Composition, 1998-99
(Composition of the Very Poor based on poverty in Percent of Population)1/
Type of Household  Base Case  Scenario One:21  Scenario Two:31  Scenario Three: 41
(1996 data)  Even 12% Decline  Poor Decline More  Rich Decline More
Composition of the Poor  A  B  A  B  A  B  A  B
Children,  No Elderly  55.1  56.9  54.5  56.7  54.9  56.0  54.1  55.9
Elderly, No Children  15.9  15.4  16.2  16.2  16.1  16.4  16.4  16.4
Both Children & Elderly  20.6  22.2  20.6  21.4  20.5  21.5  20.9  20.9
Neither Children Nor Elderly  8.5  5.6  8.6  10.7  8.5  6.1  8.6  6.8
Composition of the Non-Poor
Children, No Elderly  39.5  44.3  38.2  43.8  38.5  44.2  38.2  43.9
Elderly, No Children  32.0  26.7  33.5  27.0  33.0  26.8  33.8  27.1
Both Children & Elderly  15.4  16.9  14.8  17.0  15.1  16.9  14.3  16.9
NeitherChildren Nor Elderly  13.1  12.1  13.5  12.1  13.4  12.1  13.7  12.1
Source: Author calculations  based on World Bank version of RLMS data base.
Notes:
1/ 1996 household data scaled up to population size by multiplying by household size (sample was essentially self-weighting).
2/ An assumed decline of 12 percent in real consumption was distributed evenly across the distribution.
3/  A weighted average decline of 12 percent in real consumption was distributed as 7.75 % decline for the poor and a 15.5
percent decline for the non-poor.
4/  A weighted average decline of 12 percent in real consumption was distributed as 16.8 percent decline for the poor and a 8.4
% decline for the non-poor.
Should be noted that from the point of view of "newly" poor, only declines in the non-poor real consumption are significant,
since the poor simply remain poor under any scenario.
4/ A denotes poverty, and B denotes extreme poverty, as discussed in the text.
29Annex I - Table 6:  Russia: Location Composition And Extreme  Poverty, 1998-99
(Composition  of the Poor  based  on poverty  in  Percent  of Population)  I1/
Type of Household  Base Case  Scenario One 2/  Scenario  Two 31 Scenario Three
(1996 data)  (Even 12%  PoDr  Decline  More  4/
Decline)  Rich Decline
More
A  B  A  B  A  B  A  B
Composition  of the very poor
Major Metropolitan  5.3  2.9  6.2  3.2  5.9  3.0  6.7  3.4
Other Urban  58.8  53.0  59.9  54.0  59.7  53.1  60.1  53.4
Rural  35.9  44.1  33.9  42.8  34.4  43.9  33.3  43.2
Composition  of the Non-Poor
Major Metropolitan  14.0  11.5  14.1  11.8  14.0  11.7  13.8  11.9
OtherUrban  60.6  61.0  59.7  61.1  59.9  61.2  59.6  61.4
Rural  25.4  27.5  26.2  27.1  26.1  27.1  26.6  26.8
1femorandum  Items: Composition of the Population
Major Metropolitan  10.2
Other Urban  59.8
Rural  30.0
Source: Author calculations based on World Bank version of RLMS data base
Notes:
I/  1996 household  data scaled up to population size by multiplying by household size (sample was essentially self-weighting).
2/ An assumed  decline of 12 percent in real consumption was distributed evenly across the distribution
3/  A weighted average decline of  12 percent in real consumption was distributed as 7.75 % decline for the poor and a 15.5
percent decline  for the non-poor.
4/  A weighted average decline of 12 percent in real consumption was distributed as 16.8  percent decline for the poor and a 8.4
% decline for the non-poor.
Should be noted that from the point of view of "newly" poor, only declines in the non-poor real consumption are significant,
since the poor simply remain poor under any scenario.
30Annex I - Table 7:  Russia: Poverty Among Children,  Adults And The Elderly (Population Basis Data)11
(Average in Members by Type), 1998-99
Members  Members  Members  Members
Type of Household  Base Case  Percent  Scenario One: 21  Percent  Scenario Two: 3/  Percent  Scenario Three: 41  Percent
(1996 data)  Even 12% Decline  Poor Decline More  Rich Decline More
Composition of the Poor
Children  1.457  36.1  1.422  35.6  1.433  35.8  1.417  35.5
Adults  2.081  51.6  2.069  51.8  2.073  51.7  2.067  51.8
Elderly  0.496  12.3  0.505  12.6  0.500  12.5  0.509  12.7
Household size  4.034  100.0  3.996  100.0  4.005  100.0  3.993  100.0
Composition of the Non-Poor
Children  0.845  26.0  0.807  25.3  0.822  25.5  0.796  25.0
Adults  1.724  53.0  1.693  53.0  1.705  53.0  1.685  53.0
Elderly  0.683  21.0  0.696  21.8  0.693  21.5  0.697  21.9




Children  1.109  30.9
Adults  1.878  52.3
Elderly  0.602  16.8
Household size  3.589  100.0
Source: Author calculations based on World Bank version of RLMS data base.
Notes:
1! 1996 household data scaled up to population size by multiplying by household size (sample was essentially self weighting).
2/ An assumed decline of 12 percent in real consumption was distributed evenly across the distribution
3/  A weighted average decline of 12 percent in real consumption was distributed as .75 % decline for the poor and a 15.5
percent decline for the non-poor.
4/ A weighted average decline of 12 percent in real consumption was distributed as 16.8 percent decline for the poor and a 8.4
% decline for the non-poor.
Should be noted that from the point of view of "newly" poor, only declines in the non-poor real consumption are significant,
since the poor simply remain poor under any scenario.
Annex  I - Table 8:  Russia: Extreme Poverty Rates And Dependents, 1998-99
(Based on Extreme Poverty in Percent of Population)1'
Type of Household  Base Case  Scenario One: 2/  - Scenario Two: 3/  Scenario Three: 4U
(1996 data)  Even 12% Decline  Poor Decline More  Rich Decline More
A  B  A  B  A  B  A  B
Number of Elderly Members
None  47.8  16.3  54.1  20.2  52.0  18.6  55.2  21.2
One  39.9  13.6  45.1  16.2  43.2  15.4  47.4  18.0
Two  31.5  12.2  37.6  14.6  35.5  14.4  38.7  14.8
Three  38.8  17.9  43.3  22.4  38.8  22.4  43.3  22.4
Number of Children
None  30.6  9.9  35.6  12.9  33.5  11.9  36.9  13.8
One  48.6  15.9  55.6  19.0  53.1  17.9  57.0  20.1
Two or More  61.2  29.2  67.5  28.5  66.0  26.7  69.1  30.0
Source: Author calculations based on World Bank version of RLMS data base.
31Annex  1 - Table 9:  Russia: Poverty Rates And Unemployment, 1998-99
(Based on Poverty in Percent of Population)1'
Type of Household  Base Case  Scenario One:  2/  Scenario Two: 3/  Scenario Three: 4/
(1996 data)  Even 12% Decline  Poor Decline More  Rich Decline More
Number of Unemployed
None  41.7  47.6  45.6  50.0
One  52.0  58.8  56.2  61.3
Two  42.2  42.2  42.2  42.2
Three 51  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
Four 6/  0  0  0  0
Source: Author calculations based on World Bank version of RLMS data base.
Notes:
1/ 1996 household data scaled up to population size by multiplying  by household size (sample was essentially self-weighting).
2/ An assumed decline of 12 percent in real consumption was distributed evenly across the distribution.
3/  A weighted average decline of 12 percent in real consumption  was distributed as  7.75 % decline for the poor and a 15.5
percent decline for the non-poor.
4/  A weighted average decline of 12 percent in real consumption  was distributed as 16.8 percent decline for the poor and a 8.4
% decline for the non-poor.
Should be noted that from the point of view of "newly" poor, only declines in the non-poor real consumption are significant,
since the poor simply remain poor under any scenario.
5/ Results are not representative; only 15 households reported  that they had three unemployed members.
6/ Results are not representative; only 6 households reported that they had four
unemployed members.
Annex 1 - Table 10:  Russia's Transfers: Incidence  Analysis, 1994-1996
Concentration  (Gini) Coefficients  for Transfers
1994  1995  1996
Ex Ante Recipient  Ex Ante Recipient  Ex Ante Recipient
Public Transfers
Pensions  59.1  52.1  55.9
Child Allowance  35.9  34.5-  38.3
Fuel Allowance  35.5  33.9  38.0
Student Stipends  35.2  34.0  37.8
Unemployment Benefit  35.4  34.0  37.9
Private Transfers
Alimony  35.6  34.1  38.5
NGOs  36.8  34.9  38.3
Relatives  42.4  41.8  52.5
Memorandum Items
Ex-Ante Consumption, no public transfers  59.9  52.6  55.9
Ex-Post Consumption  47.3  43.8  47.2
Source: Author Calculations  from the World Bank version of the RLMS dataset.
32ANNEX  2: COMMUNITY  SOLIDARITY  FUND
1.  A Community Solidarity Fund could be set up as a new social services delivery mechanism, to
cope with the problem of ineffectiveness of the existing delivery mechanisms. The CSF will enable to
provide: (i) a flexible, multi-sectoral approach to financing localsocio-economicprojects that can target
the poor; (ii) a  mechanism to  complement the existing system and improve  overall capacity to meet
priority social service needs at the local level; (iii) can help in the introduction of innovative approaches
in delivering social  services at  the  local  level, especially  in  encouraging the participation  of  the
beneficiaries (financial participation, preparation and implementation of  sub-projects); (iv)  a  way to
introduce mechanisms to reduce  the  risk of  corruption and  misuse of  funds and  demonstrate new
approaches in this area which can be integrated afterwards in local government procedures; (v) a way to
build local capacities  for  community development and mutual  support through involvement in a clear
and  organized way  all  stakeholders  in  the  delivery  of  social  services  (state,  region,  raion,  local
municipalities, social services, NGOs and associations); (vi) a way to  introduce competitive mechanismns
at the local level through bidding of local institutions for sub-projects; (vii) an instrument toencourage
partnership  between different  levels of government and  private and civic organizations in the fight
against poverty; (viii) a way to efficiently channel donorfunding  directly to beneficiaries.
2. The short-term immediate objectives of the CSF would be: i) a  rapid response to priority  needs
expressed by the community; ii) improved quality of social and economic services directly targeted to
most vulnerable population groups and areas (street children, orphans, elderly and other identified by
communities); iii) built  local  capacity in  social service delivery (municipalities, communities, local
associations, NGOs etc); iv) temporary employment generated through financing labor-intensive public
works; and v) strengthened capacity of private small-scale contractors and other micro-businesses so
that they can benefit directly or indirectly from contracts financed by the project.
3. In the long term the CSF can contribute to: i) an improved quality of delivery of community-based
basic social  and economic services for poor segments of population; and  ii) developed community
solidarity sense  through  encouragement of  community  initiatives  and  strengthening their  decision
making, organizational and managerial capacities.
4. The CSF project could be implemented in two phases: i) pilot project and ii) main investment project.
The pilot project can be implemented with the assistance of the interested donors and should target at
least three pilot oblasts to provide a  representative sample of oblasts in order to:  i) test the proposed
mechanism and provide lessons for the design of the main  fund; ii) demonstrate to the Government,
donors and communities the benefits and impact of demand-driven financing mechanism; iii) prepare the
establishment of the  main fund; and  iv) develop  sub-project criteria,  the CSF  Operational Manual,
Management Information System, including the  financial  management and  monitoring systems;  v)
develop a targeting map and resource allocations matrix for the main fund. At the end of the pilot project
a beneficiary impact assessment study could be undertaken, which along with financial and technical
audit reports could serve a basis for drafting "lessons learned" pilot evaluation report.
5.  The CSD should support local level initiatives identified by institutions which are as close as possible
to the beneficiaries. The sub-projects financed by the CSD should be implemented by small urban and
rural municipalities, local associations and NGOs with good track record of implementation,  with support
from raion level administration.  The system should be set-up to respond to demand.  The local level
organizations should identify needs, prepare sub-project proposals, enter into a contract with the CSD for
the  implementation of the  sub-projects when  approved  by  the  CSD  regional  selection committee,
33implement the sub-projects,  report regularly to the CSD supervisor and the community on the progress of
the sub-project.
6. Targeting and monitoring should be key to ensure effectiveness of CSF operations.
7.  Targeting  could  be  carried out through the  following three  ways:  (i)  geographic  targeting --
considering the size of the Russian federation  CSD programs can be successful only if very well targeted.
The project will need to develop a geographic  targeting matrix and identify oblasts (and raions within the
oblast) and prioritize them for intervention.  It would be very important to ensure that the participating
regions accept to collaborate with the CSF based on the rules define in the Operational Manual; (ii)
poverty targeting -- participating oblasts should be identified through a needs and capacity assessment
carried out based on sound criteria, such as, for example:  high level of poverty, high level of arrears  in
payment of wages and benefit to the population,  high level of unemployment, lack of availability of food
and essential goods, some indicators of social stress etc. However, much more precise criteria will need
to be developed during the pilot phase; (iii) at the sub-project level a self targeting mechanism should be
used to support the community initiative and activity at first-come first-served basis and through the
detailed menu (typology) of sub-projects  eligible for funding. The sub-projects should be implemented  in
areas with special needs for special  programs.
8.  Monitoring will be essential to the success of the project and for that reason should be its major
component. The monitoring system with the following three essential components should help to ensure
the proper use of funds: (i) studies and audits -- the following special studies could be conducted by the
external evaluators on the annual basis: a) beneficiary  impact assessment study of 10% completed sample
sub-projects; b) procurement and technical audit to  evaluate a quality of civil works and procurement
practices of sample of 10% of completed sub-projects; c) financial audit evaluating project financial
performance; and d) performance audit to evaluated the compliance with procedure established in the
Operational Manual. The results of studies should be widely published to ensure transparency of the
project; (ii) the Management Information System (MIS) which could be developed during the pilot
project and linked to the financial/management  and accounting system should be a cornerstone tool of the
CSF  monitoring effort. It  should support detailed day-to-day project monitoring  including physical
progress, financial monitoring, payments and strategic management decision-making; (iii)sub-project
monitoring should be conducted  by the beneficiaries through the following procedure to be established  in
the Operational Manual: a) every sub-project  should have to have a local supervisor permanently present
at the site to monitor the quality  of the civil works and verify the quantity of the completed works eligible
for payment; b) the implementing  agency should verify works completed by the contractors and issue the
payment requests to the CSF; c) the CSF staff should sign off every request for payment; d) the CSF
staff/consultants will have to conduct  random follow-up visits to the participating communities to monitor
the  social impact and progress of works; e) the implementing agencies should be required to inforui
beneficiaries about progress of sub-project on a regular basis through public meetings, publication of
results etc.; and f) regular internal  audits should be conducted by CSF internal auditors.
9.  Project  typology  --  the  CSF  may  fund  a  range  of  programs.  The  menu/typology  of  sub-projects
eligible for financing under each programs should be determined during the project preparation based on
the lessons learned from the pilot project. The following programs can be considered for financing:
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This program would be mostly targeted at street children, but could also include program of outreach for
pensioners living alone and handicapped outside of institutions. The program should support the sub-
projects of outreach for these groups and could consist of activities such as community shelters, soup
kitchens, program to support children in difficult situation to stay in schools etc. mostly through small-
scale investments for: i) rehabilitation of building; ii) small essential equipment and furniture, iii) special
programs; iv) short term training; v) technical advise to improve maintenance and sustainability of the
operation  etc. The average size of sub-projects should be around US$ 40,000.
b) support  for  the improvement of community-based social services  for  small isolated cities and villages
This program would particularly focus on improvement in the delivery of basic community-based social
services through financing:  i) civil works  for  rehabilitation of community-owned kindergartens and
schools, local health posts, small water supply, sewage and sanitation systems, community centers, and
environmental sub-projects  such  as  clean  up,  tree  planting,  soil  erosion  control,  and  landslide
rehabilitation etc.; ii) small equipment and furniture; iii) training/retraining of personnel of rehabilitated
facilities and community members; and iv) innovative social programs. The average size of sub-projects
would be about US$ 100,000.
c) supportfor  the improvement of community-based economic services for small isolated cities and villages
This program would support sub-projects aiming to  improve the basic economic infrastructure to help
communities to gain better access to main markets and provide better service essential for improvement
of economic situation of the population through financing: i) civil works for rehabilitation of community
access roads, market places, community bath, local communication system etc. ii) training of community
members and technical assistance; iii) innovative programs in training of business skills, retraining etc.
The average size of sub-projects  would be about US$ 100,000.
10.  The CSD  institutional set-up should have the  following  key  features: (i)  the CSD  should be
established as  an  autonomous  institution  which  should operate  according to  a  clear  division  of
responsibilities between different actors and in particular between different level of the government. It
will need a legal status which will enable it to enter into contractual agreements with other legal entities
and adopt it's own procedures for disbursement of funds. The structure does not need to be permanent, it
can be set-up for a specific period of time. The CSF should be in a position to  sign agreements with
subjects of the federation to ensure clear understanding of the way the fund should operate in each region;
(ii) the CSF should have a Board which will oversee the activities of the CSF executive office and define
the policies of the fund. It should be composed of 6 to 8 members with at least two to three members not
from the government (trade union, university/research, NGOs or other civil society organizations).  The
Board should review and approve the CSF Operational Manual,  approve annual program and budget,
quarterly and annual progress reports, approve the regional allocation of funds based on the targeting
mechanisms, on a competitive basis designate the director of the executive office and appoint auditors;
(iii) the CSF should have an Executive office, headed by the CSF executive director. The executive office
should be responsible for the promotion of CSF activities, appraisal of sub-projects submitted by local
institutions.  The executive office should ensure that the secretariat of the local approval committee is in
place, will enter into contract with the local implementing agencies, disburse funds to local contractors
and implementing agencies, monitor the progress of the sub-projects, monitor the impact of the  sub-
projects, maintain the targeting map updated, maintain Management Information System. The CSF office
at the center should be small and it should open temporary field offices in areas where the  fund is
operating; (iv)  CSF  should have local  offices which  should also  be  small and  should hire  locally
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Local offices should have at  least a head, an accountant/financial officer, a permanent promoter and a
permanent appraisal officer and follow-up officer as well as program specialists; (v)  local level approval
committees should be set-up in each targeted region or area of intervention of the CSF (group of raion).
They should include representatives of the region, of the raions, of local civil society organizations
(NGOs, universities, academia, chambers of commerce etc.) and the representatives  of the CSF as an
observer. They would approve sub-projects appraised by  the  CSF  local offices; (vi) implementing
agencies  can  be  municipalities, village  councils,  association  of  beneficiaries, NGOs  and  other
local/community-based  organizations. They should prepare sub-project proposal, enter into contract with
the CSF once the sub-project is approved, select contractors and suppliers according to the procurement
procedures defined in the Operational Manual and implement the sub-project.
1  1. Sub-project approval should be based on the sound selection and evaluation  criteria  which should be
approved by the Board and clearly reflected in the Operational Manual. The developed criteria should
assess the sub-projects  for: (i) social; (ii) institutional;  (iii) economic; (iv) technical;  and (v) environmental
soundness using the indicators such as community needs (maximum social benefits to poor/vulnerable),
capacity of community  to participate and contribute  to the sub-project, sub-project  size and cost limits, cost-
effectiveness (cost per beneficiary, cost per basic unit etc.), sub-project technical feasibility and  labor
intensity (local employment  generation),  feasibility  of operations,  maintenance  and sistainability  plans etc.
The two criteria provided below should be a particular focus of the CSF appraisal: a)  participation -- the
sub-project should respond to the actual demands of the groups and communities  initiating proposal. In
order to demonstrate their commitment the requesting institutions (NGO, local government, community
etc.) will have to share the investment cost with the CSF. The contribution can be made in form of cash,
in-kind and/or labor and should be at least of 20% of total sub-project cost; b) sustainability -- the sub-
projects should have a well-developed operations, maintenance and sustainability  plans with elements of
cost-recovery  mechanism. Recurrent costs should remain the responsibility of local organizations.
12. The CSF would be expected to have the following  outputs: i) improved delivery  of basic essential social
and  economic services in targeted communities; ii)  rehabilitated  infrastructure facilities; iii)  improved
capacities of local govemment and  other  local institutions in delivery  of essential social  services; iv)
improved living standards of targeted vulnerable groups of population; v) temporary  jobs created; and vi)
improved capacities of local contractors for competing and executing contracts under  market conditions.
36ANNEX  3: TARGETING  INITIATIVE
1.  This annex lays out a possible plan for targeting local social assistance in response to the ruble
devaluation/financial crisis of late 1998 as well as the general need to improve the provision of social
assistance.  There is a greatly increased need to target social assistance in the wake of the ruble crisis.
Also, there  exists Russian experience with targeting that could rapidly be expanded to  improve the
delivery of social assistance to the poor and to build consensus about the social equity of targeting the
poor.  The targeting initiative (TI) could be undertaken relatively quickly, given the unanimity of opinion
on  the  desirability of  targeting  among  the  various  layers  of  government  (federal,  regional/local,
Parliament) and  the experience of the  Government of Russia (GOR)  in piloting targeting of social
assistance in three oblasts of Russia.  The note details the following aspects of the possible TI:  the
description of the component, the justification for the component, the existing Russian experience, the
possible role of the Russian "know-how" team, the geographic selection of oblasts for participation in the
process, the system of monitoring and supervision of the project process and outcomes, and the strategic
issue of how to roll out the component to eventually cover geographically the entire country.
2.  Description. The TI consists of expanding targeting of local social assistance from 3 pilot oblasts
to an additional number (to be determined) of oblasts during a specific time period (such as a calendar
year), as an immediate response to the sharply constrained financing abilities of local governments in the
reaction to the ruble crisis. The TI is a possible GOR-World  Bank investment project (or component of an
investment project).  The TI includes the transfer of knowledge about targeting from the pilot regions, the
GOR, and  the World Bank through training efforts, and  investment components in monitoring and
computerization  of local social assistance offices.  The project might be implemented by a "know-how"
team, consisting of  Russian experts, as  counterpart to the  World Bank team.  Under World Bank
operational  manual  standards, this  component  has  a  poverty  category  of  PTI  (poverty  targeted
intervention).
3.  Justification. There is a strong general consensus among the various layers of federal and local
government and Parliament, that most social assistance and government transfers are not targeted to the
poorest.  Targeting means the identification of the poor or most needy and reaching them with a social
benefit or service.  The newly formed GOR has announced  that targeting of social benefits would be the
guiding principle of its social policy. This is a genuine commitment to the principle of targeting-that
help should go to the poor.  However, there is somewhat less recognition that targeting is costly, and
requires  administrative  expenditures for  successful implementation, which  itself  is  a  complicated
undertaking.
4.  Targeting is clearly the direction that the GOR intends to take, and must take, in order to rationalize
social assistance provision in Russia, to redirect payments from the non-poor to the poor, and to reduce
or reallocate the fiscal burden associated with a system that is highly regressive in nature (paying out
primarily to the non-poor). The social assistance pilot experience presents a tremendous opportunity for
the GOR to engage in a win-win dialogue with the oblasts and with the Bank, to extend the Russian
experience gained to the remaining 86 oblasts, and to create a social protection system that is perceived
to be, and is, equitable and targeted towards the poor.
5.  The social assistance pilots are a clear example of poverty reduction efforts which cut across sectors
and involve considerations for both poverty reduction and human  development objectives.  On the
poverty reduction aspect, the social assistance pilots present the opportunity to reduce the long-term
fiscal burden of both direct cash and in-kind transfers (posobiya and l'goty)  and  cross-subsidies on
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poor. 5
6.  On  the human  development side, the  pilots  represented the  unique chance to  target  benefits
correlated to poverty, instead of relying on infeasible, expensive, and impractical recommendations to
test statutory income only (often unpaid and exclusive of informal earnings) or to retain the outdated
categorical approach inherited from the previous regime which excludes the newly poor, particularly
families with children and with unemployed or under-employed  members.
7.  Existing Experience in Russia. At least one-half of Russian oblasts have some form of targeting in
place  for  the  allocation  of  locally-financed social  assistance benefits.  Additionally, the  GOR  in
conjunction with the World Bank conducted experiments in targeting in three oblasts.  These targeting
pilots  consisted  of  a  system  for  monitoring  baseline  and  outcome data, the  introduction  of  an
experimental targeting methodology, and the payout of a temporary benefit for the poorest of the poor.
Most of the existing methodologies would require significant vetting and modification before they could
be used for reliable targeting. Reliable targeting was achieved by the successful implementation of three
different targeting systems in three  very different oblasts (Komi, Voronezh, Volgograd) of Russia,
demonstrating several key facts: (i) the feasibility of targeting, in addition to its necessity; (ii) increase in
social consensus in the oblasts that introduced targeting; (iii) increased importance of targeting in the
time of crisis; (iv) the importance of transparency and conciliation commissions of client dissatisfaction
(see Chapter 3 of the report for details).
8.  Know-how team. The Russian social assistance pilots were implemented by a primary team of three
World Bank experts and one main GOR counterpart in the Ministry of Labor and Social Development,
along with three separate Russian research institutes (one per oblast) and the local authorities. The pilots
supervision  period ran for 12 calendar months, but with interruptions in the program and a very long lead
time, the entire exercise required almost two years.  Since the expansion  of the pilots in the TI will build
directly on this previously-prepared groundwork, it is expected that the TI can be accomplished within
one calendar year of its formal signature by the GOR.  However, for this ambitious goal to be realized,
supervision will have to be delegated to a much larger team of actors and the rollout contained to a few
selected oblasts.  One possible mechanism would be the creation of a Russian "know-how" team with
responsibility for implementing improved targeting. Staff for such a team could be drawn from the local
research community, especially given the expertise accumulated by the three Russian research institutes
(SOTEKO,  VTsUZh, ISEPN) in the course of the social assistance pilots, as well as qualified government
employees. However, the logistics of rolling out targeting expertise in a country with 11 time zones are
quite challenging and should not be underestimated.
9.  Geographic Selection. The single most important criteria for the selection of which oblasts should
be included in the TI are the openness  and willingness  of oblast governments  to participate in the project.
Local governments will be required to demonstrate their willingness by financing from local resources a
random sample survey of individuals before and during the implementation phase to monitor poverty
impact (see below) and to also self-finance focus groups of those who received and who were denied
social assistance under the new/reformed methodology.
5 The country faces a challenge with cost recovery in many major areas, such as housing, energy, communications and utilities.
There are two issues:  general cross-subsidies which are given to all (i.e. the price of the metro in Moscow is low for
everyone) and there are numerous special benefits (l'gory)  which are given to privileged groups such as the elderly,
veterans, people who work in certain occupations, and etc.  While indeed some of these privileged groups may be poor,
there is clear evidence that the vast majority are not.
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several different kinds of monitoring:
*  monitoring of the quality of work of  social workers
*  monitoring of finances from central and local sources 6
*  mid-term course correction for methodologies
*  monitoring of administrative costs
*  planned monitoring  of beneficiaries and those who did not receive benefits
*  monitoring of actual pilot outcomes (survey)
11. The TI will require similar monitoring emphasis and will rely on most of the same methods which
were used to monitor the pilots.  In particular, the quality of the work of social workers will continue
to be a local responsibility, although "know-how" team members will be expected to attend in-take
sessions, obtain and give direct feedback to social workers, and canvass clients during their site visits
(as previously conducted for the pilots).
12. The "know-how" team or other  implementing agency will conduct mid-year reviews of all  the
participating oblasts, approximately  6  months  after  the  implementation of  a  revised  targeting
methodology has begun.  The most important aspect of the mid-year review will be to gather local
recommendations about how to  further refine the targeting methodology, and  to adopt immediate
improvements where warranted.
13. The "know-how"  team  or  other  implementing agency  will set  up  a  system  of  monitoring  of
administrative expenses in every participating oblast. Oblasts will be responsible for monthly and
quarterly reporting of number of applicants, number of payouts and rejections, profile of recipients,
and tracking of administrative costs.
14.  As part of the oblast's contribution in kind and beginning with the mid-term review, focus groups of
beneficiaries and  those who  applied  but  did  not receive  the  benefit  will be  conducted  under  the
supervision of the "know-how"  team.
15.  Oblasts will also cover the local costs (staff time, local transportation costs, data entry) of a sample
survey of the population to  monitor the  baseline  data  and outcomes.  The survey  sample will be
constructed as a three-stage panel, with survey fieldwork occurring immediately after the selection of the
oblast, at  mid-term review, and  after a year  of  implementation experience.  The survey will use  a
questionnaire similar to the pilot sample survey questionnaire, and the "know-how" team will provide
expertise on drawing the sample.  It is expected that the local Goskomstat affiliates would provide the
interviewers staff time and transportation expenses, and would complete initial data entry work locally.
16.  Rollout. Targeting should not be perceived as for experimental benefits only, when actually it can be
used extremely  effectively towards  targeting ay  benefit,  whether in  cash  or  in  kind.  First,  the
introduction of targeting for  local  social  assistance  eliminates the  old categorical approach  which
excludes the new poor, especially families with children and the unemployed. Before the introduction of
the pilot benefit in the three oblasts, local authorities were limited to helping such families only by the so-
called "one-time assistance" which was often not enough to bring the families out of poverty.  The TI will
enable  local social  assistance offices  to  use  better  criteria for  the  selection of  beneficiaries.  By
6 The experimental pilot benefit was co-financed by the federal and local budgets. The TI is intended to cover only existing
locally-financed  social assistance and not to introduce an experimental cash benefit.
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freed to reach the poorest of the poor.
17.  Other important lessons of the pilot experience  will be applied to the roll-out of targeting through the
TI:
*  The  importance of  paying  poverty-targeted benefits  in  cash wherever  possible.  Countless
respondents and social workers have informed the GOR and World Bank that the provision of a
timely benefit in cash was crucial for families to resolve problems such as immediate need for
food, for transportation to search work, or for the purchase of medication or school supplies.
Without the general-purpose nature of cash money, no system could have identified all these
individual  needs and met them successfully  through any sort of mechanism for distribution of in-
kind items.
*  Even so, it may not be possible in the short-run for many or any oblasts to continue paying social
assistance in cash, due to the pervasive nature of the mutual settlements (i.e. barter system) in
which  local taxes  are  paid  and  collected in  kind.  Nonetheless, the  lessons  learned about
identifying who in the crowd of the needy  are the most needy can easily be applied to any benefit,
whether in cash or in kind.  As the financial  situation normalizes and the country remonetizes its
economic transactions, then the very same targeting mechanism could be applied to the most
efficient kind of benefit--a poverty benefit  paid out in cash.
18. Eventually, after the TI oblasts are provided  with reliable targeting methodologies and computers for
local social assistance, the targeting efforts should be expanded to the remaining oblasts in a phased
manner,  possibly over a three-year horizon. At the same time, targeting could be expanded in the TI
oblasts to cover areas other than local social  assistance, including the payment of in-kind benefits to
privileged  groups.
40BIBLIOGRAPHY
Atinc, Tamar Manuelyan, and Michael Walton. "Social Consequences of the East Asian Financial
Crisis", The World Bank Group 1998.
Blanchard, Olivier, "The Economics of Post-Communist  Transition", Clarendon Press, Oxford 1997.
Braithwaite, Jeanine. "From Second Economy to Informal Sector: The Russian Labor Market in
Transition." Background paper for Russian Poverty Assessment. ESP Working Paper.  World
Bank, 1995.
Braithwaite, Jeanine and Tom Hoopengardner. "Who are Ukraine's Poor?" Chapter 4 in Cornelius,
Peter K. and Patrick Lenain. Eds. Ukraine: Accelerating the Transition  to Market. pp.  61-80.
Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 1997.
Buckberg, Elaine and Brian Pinto.  "How Russia is Becoming a Market Economy: A Policy Maker's
Checklist." The World Bank, mimeo, June 1997.
Desai, Padma and Idson, Todd (1998), Wage Arrears, Poverty, and Family Survival Strategies in
Russia, Columbia University Working Paper.
Desai, Padma and Idson, Todd (1998), To Pay or Not to Pay: Managerial Decision Making and  Wage
Withholding in Russia, Columbia University Working Paper.
Freinkman, Lev, Russian Federation Housing and Utility Services: Policy Priorities for the Next Stage of
Reforms, The World Bank, Report No. 17483-RU,  February 25, 1998
Gaddy, Clifford G. and Barry W. Ickes. "Beyond a Bailout: Time to Face Reality About Russia's
"Virtual Economy"'. Processed, The Brookings Institution, 1998a.
Gaddy, Clifford G. and Barry W. Ickes.  To Restructure or Not to Restructure:  Informal Activities and
Enterprise Behavior in Transition, Processed, The Brookings Institution, 1998b.
Goldberg, Itzhak and Raj Desai. "Corporate Governance in Russia." In Harry G. Broadman, "Russian
Enterprise Reform: Policies to Further the Transition." World Bank Discussion Paper,
forthcoming.
Grootaert, Christiaan and Jeanine Braithwaite. "Poverty Correlates and Indicator-Based Targeting in
Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union." Policy Research Working Paper No. 1942.
Washington, DC: The World Bank, July 1998.
Haltiwanger, John and Milan Vodopivec. "Gross Worker and Job Flows in a Transition Economy: An
Analysis of Estonia." The World Bank, processed, July 1998.
41Johnson Simon, Daniel Kaufinann, and Andrei Shleifer. "The Unofficial Economy in Transition.
Booking Paper on Economic Activity", Vol. 2: pp.1 59-239. 1997
Kapelyushnikov,  Rostislav I. "Overemployment  in Russian Industry: Roots of the Problem  and Lines of
Attack." Studies ion Russian Economic Development, Vol. 9, No. 6, 1998.
Klugman, Jeni and Jeanine Braithwaite. "Poverty In Russia During The Transition: An Overview."
World Bank Research Observer. February 1998.
Milanovic, Branko. "The Role of Social Assistance in Addressing Poverty", The World Bank,  February
1998 b, mimeo.
Milanovic, Branko. "Income, Inequality, and Poverty during the Transition from Planned to Market
Economy", World Bank Regional and Sectoral Studies, Washington, 1998a.
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1996 Labor Restructuring in Russian
Enterprises: A Case Study, Paris.
42Social Protection Discussion  Paper Series
No.  Title
9801  World Bank Lending for Labor Markets: 1991 to 1996
9802  Export Processing Zones: A Review in Need of Update
9803  Building an Environment for Pension Reform in Developing Countries
9804  Risks in Pensions and Annuities: Efficient Designs
9805  The Hungarian Pension System in Transition
9806  Government Guarantees on Pension Fund Returns
9807  A World Bank Perspective on Pension Reforn
9808  Women and Labor Market Changes in the Global Economy: Growth Helps,
Inequalities Hurt and Public Policy Matters
9809  Financing the Transition to Multipillar
9810  Pension Reform in Britain
9811  An Alternative Technical Education System: A Case Study of Mexico
9812  The Role of Choice in the Transition to a Funded Pension System
9813  Unemployment Benefits
9814  Family Allowances
9815  The Quest for Pension Reform: Poland's Security through Diversity
9816  Getting an Earful: A Review of Beneficiary Assessments of Social Funds
9817  Supervising Mandatory Funded Pension Systems: Issues and Challenges
9901  Active Labor Market Programs: A Review of the Evidence from Evaluations
9902  World Bank Lending for Labor Markets: 1991 to 1998
9903  A Bundle of Joy or an Expensive Luxury:  A Comparative Analysis of the
Economic Environment  for Family Formation in Western Europe
9904  Social Protection as Social Risk Management: Conceptual Underpinnings for
the Social Protection Sector Strategy Paper
9905  The Effects of Legislative Change on Female Labour Supply: Marriage  and
Divorce, Child and Spousal Support, Property Division and Pension SplittingSocial Protection Discussion Paper Series continued
No.  Title
9906  Optimal Unemployment  Insurance: A Guide to the Literature
9907  Collecting and Transferring  Pension Contributions
9908  Causalities  Between Social Capital and Social Funds
9909  Russia's Social Protection  Malaise: Key Reform Priorities as a Response to
the Present Crisis
9910  The Tax Treatment of Funded PensionsSummary  Findings
This  report  focuses  on changes  in the social protection  system
to lessen  the  social impact  of the economic  crisis  that confronts
the Russian  Federation  today.  The  report  is not comprehensive
and covers  exclusively the crisis-related issues.  It addresses
the key challenoes  of (i) coping with income decline and
increasing  poverty, ii) offsetting  the consequences  of reduced
public expenditure in the social sectors,  (iii) targeting and
delivering social assistance  and benefits, and (iv) improving
the functioning of labor markets.  It also  deals with selected
aspects  of emergency  assistance.  Finally,  it identifies  possible
areas  for Bank  support.
HUMAN  DEVELOPMENT  NETWORK
About  this  series...
Papers  in this series  are not formal publications of the World  Bank. They present preliminary and
unpolished resLilts of analysis that are circulated to encoLirage  discussion  and comment; citation and
the use  of sLIch  a paper shoulcl  take account  of its provisional character.  The  findings, interpretations,
andI  conclusions expressecl  in this paper are entirely those  of the author(s)  and should not be attributed
in any manner  to the World Bank,  to its affiliated  organizations  or to members  of its Board  of Executive
Ditectors or the countries they represent. For  free copies of this paper, please contact the Social
Protection  Acdvisory  Seivice,  The  Worlcl Bank, 181  8 H Street,  N.W., Room G8- 138,  Washington. D.C.
20433-000  1.  Telephone:  (202)  458-5267,  Fax:  (202i 614-047,  1,  E-niail:  socialprotectiotn@worldbank.org
or visit the Social Protection  website at www.worldbank.org/sp.